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The previous regime [in Iraq] accumulated a heavy burden of 
foreign debts to states which financed the tyrant's wars against 
his people first, and then against our neighbors. The foreign 
loans helped him build a huge military apparatus and manufac-
ture weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons 
which he used against the Iraqi people in Halabja. The loans 
supported his system of oppression and paid for his palaces and 
prisons during the war against Iran when Iraq's oil revenue was 
extremely low.… 
 
There is a strong basis in international legal principle and 
precedent to define these debts as being “odious” and thus not 
legally enforceable. This legal doctrine of odious debt was for-
mulated in the 1920s by Alexander Sack, a former Russian Min-
ister working as a legal professor in the Sorbonne University in 
Paris. He published the most extensive and important works on 
the treatment of state debts in the event of regime change.1 
                                                          
1. Recommendation (subsequently adopted) of Saad Salih Jabr, Chairman of the Econ. and 
Fin. Committee, to the Iraqi Nat’l Assembly  (Nov. 22, 2004) (emphasis added), available at 
http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/index.cfm?DSP=content&ContentID=11907 (recom-
mending that it declare a willingness to repudiate Iraq’s prior odious debts). The Iraqi National 
Assembly enthusiastically adopted the suggested resolution. Justin Alexander, Phony Relief, 
INT’L SOCIALIST REV., Issue 39, Jan.–Feb. 2005, 
http://www.isreview.org/issues/39/reports.shtml. 
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Widely different views have been expressed about the appropri-
ate treatment of Iraq’s Saddam-era debts. Some have argued that 
all of this debt, in view of its provenance, should be classified as 
odious and cancelled outright. Lend to a despot, they say, and 
you should expect repayment only from the despot. If a country 
manages to free itself from the incubus of an odious regime, the 
citizenry should not be forced to carry the burden of that re-
gime’s immoral extravagances for generations to come.2 
INTRODUCTION 
History has been kind to Alexander Nahum Sack3—kinder than life 
was, and kind rather than accurate. Unknown for much of his life and 
the half century that followed it, he has, in the years since the 2003 
United States incursion into Iraq, emerged as an international academic 
superstar. In 1927, while lecturing in Paris, Sack published a treatise in 
French on the effect of state transformations on public debt: Les Effets 
des transformations des Etats sur leurs dettes publiques et autres obli-
gations financieres (Les Effets). Sack proposed that, following a state 
succession,4 a new sovereign government could renege on the odious 
debts of the previous sovereign. According to Sack, odious debts were 
those (a) incurred without the consent of the people (by a “despotic” re-
gime); (b) from which no benefits accrued to the people; and (c) when 
the creditors had knowledge of the foregoing.5 Sack’s treatise, which 
was never translated into English, has been discovered and placed at the 
center of a heated academic and policy debate—much of it in English—
over the law of odious debts. His hitherto obscure theory has been dis-
                                                          
2. Ali Allawi, Why Iraq’s Debt Deal Makes Sense, EUROMONEY, Sept. 2005, at 213 (empha-
sis added). 
3. 1890–1955. See, e.g., Obituary, Alexander Sack, A Writer on Law: Former Professor at 
N.Y.U. Dead, Had Been Special Aide to U.S. Attorney General, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1955, at 27 
[hereinafter Sack Obituary]. 
4. Sack drew a sharp distinction between the political transformation of a state, which caused 
no change in the status of the previous regime’s debts, and a territorial change in the state, which 
might allow the partition or even invalidation of the debts of the prior state attributable to that 
territory. A.N. SACK, LES EFFETS DES TRANSFORMATIONS DES ETATS SUR LEURS DETTES 
PUBLIQUES ET AUTRES OBLIGATIONS FINANCIÈRES 46–61 (1927) [hereinafter SACK, LES 
EFFETS];  see also Anna Gelpern, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: What Iraq and Argentina Might 
Learn from Each Other, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 391, 405 (2005) (noting the “high bar” for proving a 
state succession). 
5. The sovereign borrower had the burden of demonstrating the three conditions. SACK, LES 
EFFETS, supra note 4, at 157–63. 
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cussed in the pages of The New Yorker, Le Monde, and The Times, not 
to mention dozens of other news sources, policy briefs, academic es-
says, and blogs.6 
In particular, Sack’s three-part definition has found favor with the 
contemporary proponents of an odious debts doctrine. Among debt for-
giveness circles, Sack is described in one of several ways, which this 
Article refers to as the Sackian myths: Sack is called a former Minister 
to Tsar Nicholas II or a former tsarist minister; a Russian jurist or a pro-
fessor of law in Paris; and the preeminent legal scholar on public debts, 
the originator of the odious debts doctrine, or a leading scholar of inter-
national law. Sack’s name has become so ubiquitous in the literature 
that one sees references to the “Sackian view” of odious debts,7 and one 
modern writer described him as the “crowned prince” of advocates of 
the legal principle of odious debts.8 Sack’s theory is the starting point 
for almost every discussion of the odious debts problem today; until re-
cently, his contemporaries writing on the subject merited nary a men-
tion.9 
                                                          
6. See, e.g., ERIC TOUSSAINT, YOUR MONEY OR YOUR LIFE: THE TYRANNY OF GLOBAL 
FINANCE 329 (Vicki Briault Manus et al. trans., Haymarket Books 3d ed. 2005); Charles 
Abrahams, A Fresh Look at the Odious Debt Doctrine, in ODIOUS DEBTS – HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
INDEBTEDNESS (Lis Füglister & Stefan Howald eds., 2005), available at 
http://www.aktionfinanzplatz.ch/pdf/en/WebE_Abrahams.pdf; Press Release, Eurodad, Skeletons 
in the Cupboard: Illegitimate Debt Claims of the G7 (Feb. 8, 2007), available at 
http://www.eurodad.org/debt/report.aspx?id=114&item=0442; William F. Buckley, Jr., Odious 
Activities: Should Iraqi Debt Be Repaid to Russia and France?, NAT’L REV., Oct. 7, 2003, 
http://www.nationalreview.com/buckley/buckley200310071228.asp; Posting of Larry Catá 
Backer, Advancing the Application of Odious Debt Doctrine in Ecuador, 
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2007/05/advancing-application-of-odious-debt.html (May 29, 
2007).  
7. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Mitu Gulati, Partially Odious Debts?, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. (forthcoming 2007) (using the adjective “Sackian); Adam Feibelman, Contract, Priority, 
and Odious Debt, 85 N.C. L. REV. 727, 743 (March 2007) (same); Adam Feibelman, Equitable 
Subordination, Fraudulent Transfer, and Sovereign Debt, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
(forthcoming 2007) (same). Sack shows up on Wikipedia under the entry for Odious Debts. 
Odious Debts, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Odious_debt (“The doctrine [of odious debts] was 
formalized in a 1927 treatise by Alexander Nahum Sack, a Russian emigré legal theorist….”) 
(last visited Nov. 4, 2007). 
8. Christoph G. Paulus, “Odious Debts” vs. Debt Trap: A Realistic Help?, 31 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 83, 85 (2005). 
9. See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Odious Debt Wears Two Faces: Systemic Illegitimacy, 
Problems, and Opportunities in Traditional Odious Debt Conceptions in Globalized Economic 
Regimes, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2007) (starting with Sack and then going on 
to a five-page description of Sack’s work on odious debt as a precursor to the discussion of 
odious debt in the contemporary context); Robert Howse, The Concept of Odious Debt in Public 
International Law 5–7 (UNCTAD Working Paper No. 185, July 2007), available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/osgdp185_en.pdf (starting the discussion of Odious Debt with 
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Why has the odious debts movement invested such weight in the re-
sume of one hitherto obscure legal scholar? And further, how and why 
did Sack’s iconic status arrive so suddenly and with so little biographi-
cal information about the man? Scholars typically achieve iconic 
status—of the sort where they are invoked by name as a source of au-
thority—only after years of discussion and debate about their work.10  
The answer lies partly in a quirk of customary international law. 
Sack’s prominence—particularly his status as a minister in the tsarist 
government—lends authority to his doctrine of odious debts and but-
tresses the claims of its proponents that such a doctrine exists as part of 
customary international law. The “teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists”11—which include the writings of prominent scholars in in-
ternational law—are among the secondary sources of authority that cus-
tomary international law recognizes, and thus Sack’s eminence is di-
rectly linked to a desire to validate his doctrine of odious debts.12 
It turns out that much of Sack’s contemporary identity was made up, 
but not by him. After a brief background discussion on the resurrection 
of Sack by the odious debts movement, this Article sets out the three 
Sackian mythologies told by the contemporary odious debts literature 
                                                                                                                                      
Sack); Ashfaq Khalfan, Jeff King & Bryan Thomas, Advancing the Odious Debt Doctrine 14 
(Ctr. for Int’l Sustainable Dev. Law, Paper No. COM/RES/ESJ/, 2003), available at 
http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/publications/Advancing_the_Odious_Debt_Doctrine.pdf 
(similarly, giving Sack center stage in the discussion of odious debt as a doctrine of international 
law). There are a handful of scholars in the area, however, who are beginning to realize that Sack 
was actually somewhat obscure. See, e.g., Jeff A. King, Odious Debt: The Terms of the Debate, 
32 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 605, 625–27 (2007). 
10. Invocations by name are often used as a measure of status or reputation. See David Klein 
& Darby Morrisroe, The Prestige and Influence of Individual Judges on the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 371 (1999). The faculty editor of the forthcoming two-volume set 
for Law & Contemporary Problems on Odious Debts was so struck by the repeated invocations of 
Alexander Sack in almost every one of twenty-plus articles for the symposium that she used Sack 
as an example in her recent article on writing style. In discussing the rare occasions on which it is 
acceptable for an author to refer to other authors by name in the text of an article, she writes: “Or 
the source may be a person universally recognized as so authoritative that the topic cannot as 
credibly be discussed without his or her mention.” Joan Magat, Beware the “Monological 
Imperatives”: Scholarly Writing for the Reader 23 (Duke Law Sch. Legal Studies, Paper No. 162, 
August 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1004606. 
11. Sources of international law include: “a. international conventions, whether general or 
particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; b. international 
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; c. the general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations; d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and 
the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means 
for the determination of rules of law.” Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 
26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993. 
12. E.g., Paul B. Stephan, The Institutionalist Implications of an Odious Debt Doctrine, 70 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 213 (Summer 2007). 
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and then juxtaposes the results of historical investigation with each of 
the stories. The Sackian myths do not stand up to scrutiny. The legend 
of Sack has been an untruth that conveniently bolsters the validity of the 
odious debts doctrine; the reality is less convenient, but (we hope) more 
interesting. 
I. IRAQ AND THE RESURGENCE OF ODIOUS DEBTS 
After languishing in obscurity for the better part of a century, the 
doctrine of odious debts was given new life after the United States top-
pled Saddam Hussein’s regime. The doctrine is controversial because it 
proposes an exception to the general rule of public international law that 
debts incurred by one government are inherited by the subsequent gov-
ernment. The theory is that states never die. Instead, the state exists 
separately from its government, and because governments contract 
debts as agents of the state, new governments necessarily inherit the 
debts of the old.13 
Rarely have states asserted exceptions to this strict rule of succession.  
When they did, the assertions were generally based on a theory that 
there was discontinuity between the old and new states, or that the debts 
were hostile to the new government.14 The Soviets disavowed any obli-
gation to pay the debts of the Tsar. Communist China refused to pay 
debts incurred by their Imperial predecessors in the early twentieth cen-
tury. The Islamic revolutionary government in Iran viewed as odious 
debts incurred by the Shah to purchase arms.15 For the most part, these 
assertions were tackled in the realm of diplomacy and politics, involv-
ing meetings among finance ministers and bankers in swank hotels in 
London and Paris. When the odious debts issue was raised with Iraq, 
however, the chessboard had changed and both the pieces and strategies 
were different. There were still high-level meetings in Paris, London, 
and elsewhere, and politics still trumped law. But today, sovereign bor-
rowers increasingly waive their sovereign immunity in domestic courts 
to appear credible to lenders (typically, agreeing to be sued in the two 
                                                          
13. See, e.g., ERNST H. FEILCHENFELD, PUBLIC DEBTS AND STATE SUCCESSION (1931); Lee 
C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati & Robert B. Thompson, The Dilemma of Odious Debts, 56 DUKE 
L.J. 1201, 1204–10 (2007); M. H. Hoeflich, Through a Glass Darkly: Reflections Upon the 
History of the International Law of Public Debt in Connection with State Succession, 1982 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 39 (1982). 
14. See Buchheit et al., supra note 13, at 1222; James V. Feinerman, Odious Debt, Old and 
New: The Legal Intellectual History of an Idea, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 193 (forthcoming 
2007) (describing the history of odious debt claims). 
15. King, supra note 9, at 634. 
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jurisdictions that are seen as most respectful of creditor rights—the 
United States and the United Kingdom). So in 2003, Iraq faced the 
prospect of creditors seeking to collect—some in domestic courts in the 
United States—on billions of dollars in unpaid Saddam-era debt.16 
Many in the higher echelons of the U.S. administration did not savor 
the prospect of Saddam’s creditors using the U.S. courts to attach Iraq’s 
oil revenues to pay Saddam’s bills (after all, those revenue streams were 
supposed to pay for the war). Paul Wolfowitz testified before the Senate 
that the Iraqi people should not have to pay for the guns, palaces, and 
(nonexistent) weapons of mass destruction of Saddam Hussein—
asserting, in words of a different sort, an odious debts justification for 
debt forgiveness.17 At the other end of the political spectrum, NGOs and 
activist groups, concerned with the overwhelming debt burdens in the 
developing world, were eager to back any legal strategy that the Bush 
administration might advocate with Iraq, hoping that a similar strategy 
could be extended to unburden states that did not have the powerful po-
litical allies that the new state in Iraq did. Suddenly, there was a chorus 
of voices from the far ends of both sides of the political spectrum—the 
Cato Institute and Oxfam pushing the same agenda—asserting that 
many of Saddam’s debts should not have to be paid because they were 
“odious.”18 And the unlikely jurist at the center of the chorus was Alex-
ander Nahum Sack.19 
As of early 2008, the debate over the doctrine of odious debts contin-
ues. Apart from multiple conferences addressing the topic and new aca-
demic articles, the official sector has taken up the doctrine. With fund-
ing from the Norwegian government, both the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the World 
                                                          
16. For discussion of odious debt claims in the context of the U.S. incursion into Iraq, see Jai 
Damle, The Odious Debt Doctrine After Iraq, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2007). 
17. See Alan Elsner, U.S. Considering “Odious Debt” Doctrine for Iraq, REUTERS NEWS, 
Apr. 29, 2003 (reporting that Paul Wolfowitz, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, observed in 
testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee that much of the money borrowed by the 
Iraqi regime had been used “to buy weapons and to build palaces and to build instruments of 
oppression”); see also Soren Ambrose & Njoki Njoroge Njehu, A Wolf in Wolf’s Clothing: Paul 
Wolfowitz, New World Bank President, ECON. JUSTICE NEWS, Apr. 2005, 
http://www.50years.org/cms/ejn/story/258. 
18. See PATRICIA ADAMS, IRAQ’S ODIOUS DEBTS, CATO POL’Y ANALYSIS, NO. 526 (Sept. 
28, 2004); NILE GARDINER & MARC MILES, FORGIVE THE IRAQI DEBT, HERITAGE FOUNDATION 
EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM NO. 871 (Apr. 30, 2003); A Fresh Start for Iraq: The Case for Debt 
Relief (Oxfam Briefing Paper No. 48, May 2003); see also Jonathan Shafter, The Due Diligence 
Model: A New Approach to the Problem of Odious Debts, 21 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 49 (2007) 
(observing this peculiar coalition and its implications). 
19. See, e.g., Khalfan et al., supra note 9, at 14. 
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Bank have released reports on the topic and both contain invocations of 
Alexander Sack as the originator of the doctrine.20 
II. THE THREE SACKIAN MYTHOLOGIES 
A. From Tsarist Minister to Revolutionary Hero 
Modern commentators often refer to Sack as having been a tsarist 
minister,21 a myth with twofold significance. First, it gives Sack status 
in the government of a major power, which is relevant to modern asser-
tions that Sack’s views from the early 1900s are an authoritative source 
of public international law at the time. As a tsarist minister, Sack would 
have had first-hand knowledge of how states viewed odious debts at the 
time, and indeed, may have been in a position to shape state policy on 
odious debts.  Second, it shows that Sack was personally familiar with 
the issue of odious debts because he worked for the sovereign whose 
debts were repudiated by the Bolsheviks in 1918. The Bolsheviks de-
scribed these debts as belonging to the government of the “Tsar, the 
landowners, and the bourgeoisie.”22 The repudiation was intended to 
deal a “first blow” to international capital and to strengthen the govern-
ment of the proletariat against its exploiters.23  
Commentators likely take their characterization of Sack as a minister 
of the Tsar from an article by legal historian Michael Hoeflich, who de-
                                                          
20. See Howse, supra note 9, at 5–7; The Concept of Odious Debt: Some Considerations 
(World Bank Econ. Policy & Debt Dep’t, Discussion Paper, Sept. 7, 2007), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDEBTDEPT/Resources/OdiousPaper07.pdf; see also 
Conference: World Economy and Global Finance, Centre for the Study of Globalisation and 
Regionalisation and the Economic and Social Research Council (Univ. of Warwick, July 11–15, 
2007); Conference: Debt, Sovereignty and Power: The Contemporary Issues, Mellon Series 
(Cambridge Univ., Sept. 2007); Sixth Debt Management Conference, UNCTAD (Nov. 19–21, 
2007); International Conference on Illegitimate Debts, Aktion Finanzplatz (Bern, Switzerland, 
Oct. 3–4, 2007). 
21. E.g., TOUSSAINT, supra note 6; David Beatson, Live 8, G8, and Heavy W8 for Africa, 
INDEPENDENT-NZ, June 15, 2005; Andrea Davis, African Debt Relief Package Not Good 
Enough, GUELPH MERCURY, June 27, 2005, at A9; Franz Derouin & Marion Van Renterghem, 
11,000 personnes ont défilé à Paris pour proclamer que le triomphe militaire ne légitime pas la 
guerre, LE MONDE, Apr. 15, 2003; Remi Ogunmefun, Legalities in Repudiating Nigeria’s 
Foreign Debt, THIS DAY (Nigeria), June 13, 2005; Irwin M. Stelzer, Forgive Them His Debts, 
WKLY. STANDARD, Apr. 21, 2003, at 24; Joseph Hanlon, Defining Illegitimate Debt and Linking 
its Cancellation to Economic Justice (June 2002) (unpublished manuscript prepared for 
Norwegian Church Aid), available at http://www.globalfairtrade.ca/Illegitimatedebt.pdf. 
22. See Alexander N. Sack, Diplomatic Claims Against the Soviets (1918-1938), 15 N.Y.U. 
L.Q. REV. 507, 510 n.12 (1938) [hereinafter Sack, Diplomatic Claims]. 
23. Id. at 510. 
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scribed Sack as “once a minister of Tsarist Russia and thence, after the 
October Revolution, a Parisian law professor.”24 In 1991, debt activist 
Patricia Adams echoed Hoeflich’s characterization, describing Sack as 
“a former minister of Tsarist Russia and, after the Russian Revolution, a 
professor of law in Paris,” in her influential book Odious Debts: Loose 
Lending, Corruption, and the Third World’s Environmental Legacy.25 
Adams’s book became a key element of the post-Iraq odious debts de-
bate and that, in turn, resulted in the rapid dissemination of the story of 
Sack as a tsarist minister. The characterization has since appeared in 
scores of newspaper stories, academic articles, anti-debt activist 
speeches, websites, and most prominently, in the Iraqi National Assem-
bly in November 2004.26 The story of Sack as a revolutionary hero—the 
man who authored a doctrine that will save poor nations from crippling 
                                                          
24. Hoeflich, supra note 13, at 41. Hoeflich obtained the information that Sack was a tsarist 
minister from an inscription at the front of one of Sack’s books at the Squire library at Cambridge 
University, where Hoeflich was doing research at the time. E-mail from Michael Hoeflich to Mitu 
Gulati (Sept. 6, 2007, 09:58 EST) (on file with authors); see also infra notes 47–49 and 
accompanying text. The error, in what is one of the best pieces of work on state succession, 
appears to have been inadvertent. One of the authors (Gulati), along with Professor Gelpern of 
Rutgers University, went to the Squire library in September 2007 to look for the inscription that 
Hoeflich had seen. Unfortunately, the Squire library had changed locations since Hoeflich was 
doing his research there, and we were unable to look at the same books Hoeflich likely examined. 
Among all the books by Sack that we searched in the new Squire library, we found no books with 
inscriptions in them. In fact, the books by Sack that we looked at appeared to have almost never 
been touched. See also E-mail from David Wills, Head Librarian, Squire Library, to Mitu Gulati 
& Lauren Collins (Sept. 13, 2007, 05:50 EST) (on file with authors). 
25. PATRICIA ADAMS, ODIOUS DEBTS: LOOSE LENDING, CORRUPTION, AND THE THIRD 
WORLD’S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY 164 (1991). 
26. See The Economic and Finance Committee of the Iraqi National Assembly, 
Recommendation on the External Odious Debts and Reparations Inherited from the Tyrannical 
Saddam Regime (presented Nov. 22, 2004), available at 
http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/index.cfm?DSP=content&ContentID=11907. The 
resolution was adopted enthusiastically by the Iraqi National Congress. Alexander, supra note 1. 
For other materials describing Sack’s ministerial status, see, for example, ADAMS, supra note 25, 
at 164; ADAMS, supra note 18, at 3; Doktrin “Odious Debt” Harus Ditempuh, KOMPAS 
(Indonesia), Feb. 5, 2000, available at http://www.kompas.com/kompas-
cetak/0002/05/ekonomi/dokt13.htm; Susan George, Down the Great Financial Drain: How Debt 
and the Washington Consensus Destroy Development and Create Poverty, DEVELOPMENT, June 
2007, at 4, 10; Damien Millet, La dette de l'Irak n'ajamais existé, LE MONDE, Nov. 23, 2004; 
Leonce Ndikumana & James K. Boyce, Congo’s Odious Debt: External Borrowing and Capital 
Flight in Zaire, 29 DEV. & CHANGE 195, 213 (1998); James Surowiecki, A Clean Slate for Iraq, 
NEW YORKER, Apr. 7, 2003, at 33; Alternative Information and Development Center, Apartheid 
Debt, Oct. 17, 1997, http://www.aidc.org.za/?q=book/view/17; WORLD DEVELOPMENT 
MOVEMENT, RE-BUILDING IRAQ: START BY CANCELLING THE DEBT (Apr. 2003), 
http://www.wdm.org.uk/resources/reports/debt/rebuildingiraq01042003.pdf; Posting of Stephan 
Kinsella to Mises Blog, Repudiate the Iraqi Debt!, http://blog.mises.org/archives/003662.asp 
(June 2, 2005, 11:15 EST).  
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debt burdens—is not one that is told explicitly;27 it is implicit in the he-
roic status that he has achieved among the debt forgiveness crowd.28 
The websites of organizations such as Probe International feature Sack’s 
name, as do the writings of anti-debt activists such as Patricia Adams.29 
B. Russian Professor of Law in Paris 
Contemporary commentators generally refer to Sack as a law profes-
sor in Paris (he was elevated to a “professor at the Sorbonne” in the 
Iraqi National Assembly discussions), or a Russian émigré law profes-
                                                          
27. Other commentators have described Sack as a champion of creditors’ rights. See Günter 
Frankenberg & Rolf Knieper, Legal Problems of the Overindebtedness of Developing Countries: 
The Current Relevance of the Doctrine of Odious Debts, 12 INT’L J. SOC. L. 415, 427 (1984) 
(noting that the French commentators of the 1920s, notably Jèze (1921) and Sack (1926), were at 
the extreme end of the spectrum in terms of their eagerness to protect creditor claims); see also 
Ben-Shahar & Gulati, supra note 7, at 109 n.11. 
28. Howse comes closest to telling an explicit story of Sack as an anti-tsarist revolutionary 
hero. Howse invokes Sack’s status as a tsarist minister in the context of using the Soviet 
repudiation of the tsarist debt as an example of the invocation of an odious debts argument by a 
state. He writes: 
Sack, who himself was a former minister in the tsarist regime, notes a particular Soviet 
doctrine that regards acts of previous governments as incurring personal obligations 
only, and not ones that bind the state. Nevertheless even for Sack, it could be argued that 
the repudiated debts were “odious” and therefore were unenforceable against the 
successor regime, given the evidence that tsarist Russia did not rule in the interests of its 
population. 
Howse, supra note 9, at 18 (citations omitted). 
29. Patricia Adams, Iraq's Odious Debts: The Odious Debt Doctrine and Iraq after Saddam, 
Address Before International Conference on Iraq and Debt Relief (Mar. 16, 2004), available at  
http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/index.cfm?DSP=content&ContentID=9892. But, as 
Adams acknowledges, there is an inherent tension in the story of Sack’s transformation from 
tsarist to revolutionary: 
Professor Sack was no radical. He had been a minister in the Tsarist regime and had 
seen the Bolshevik repudiation of the Tsarist debt. He believed that government debts 
should be repaid when a new government came to power. Otherwise, he said, chaos 
would reign in relations between nations and international trade and finance would 
break down. 
But he also believed there was one exception to this rule. Sack believed that debts not 
created in the interests of the state should not be bound to this general rule. 
Some debts, he said, are odious. 
ADAMS, supra note 25, at 166. Adams later argues that Sack’s intent in developing the doctrine, 
and in particular in putting the onus on successor governments to prove odiousness, was to 
prevent “abuse [of the doctrine] by self-serving interpretation,” thus suggesting that Sack was 
trying to develop a method for identifying truly odious debts so that repudiation would occur only 
in worthy cases. Id. Despite stating that Sack was no radical, and acknowledging that his doctrine 
of odious debts is quite conservative—which might seem to disqualify Sack as a hero of the 
somewhat radical debt forgiveness movement—Adams continues to lionize Sack in her writing. 
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sor in Paris.30 These commentators are presumably relying on the fact 
that Les Effets was published in French in Paris, 31 and the title page of 
the volume, which describes Sack as “ancien professeur agrégé a la 
faculté de droit de l’université de Petrograd” (a former professor 
“agrégé” of the faculty of law at the University of St. Petersburg).32 It is 
rarely mentioned that Sack also taught at two American law schools, 
New York University (NYU) and Northwestern, and was a staff attor-
ney at the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). These references to Sack’s 
tenure in Paris or status as a Russian émigré seem designed to enhance 
Sack’s status, not to mention that an association with two European 
countries makes Sack seem more worldly and, well, international. 
The Russo-Parisian myth raises several additional questions about the 
meaning of the doctrine and whether Sack would have compromised his 
ideas in any way to please his French audience. The Soviet repudiation 
of the Tsar’s debt was a major political issue in 1920s France. In 1923, 
French citizens were owed nine billion gold francs on the face value of 
their tsarist bonds, and the arrears on payments added four hundred mil-
lion gold francs each year.33 Resentment about the default was particu-
larly high because many French bondholders thought they had been de-
frauded, as the Russian government (assisted by the French 
government) had allegedly bribed the French press to paint an unrea-
                                                          
30. E.g., ADAMS, supra note 25, at 164 (“Sack, a former minister of Tsarist Russia and, after 
the Russian Revolution, a professor of law in Paris”); Patricia Adams, Debt Forgiveness, 
NATIONAL POST (Canada), June 26, 2003, available at 
http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/index.cfm?DSP=content&ContentID=7759 (“Alexander 
Sack, the Russian legal scholar who coined the term ‘odious debt’”); Patricia Adams, Nice Try, 
Paris Club, FINANCIAL POST (Canada), Nov. 26, 2004, available at 
http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/index.cfm?DSP=content&ContentID=11940 
(“…Alexander Sack, a former Russian Minister working as a legal professor in the Sorbonne 
University in Paris.”); Charles Mutasa, Campaigning on Illegitimate Debts: Lessons, Prospects 
and Proposals (AFRODAD, Occasional Papers, August 2006), available at 
http://www.afrodad.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=118&Itemid=50 (“The 
role and contribution of Alexander Sack, the professor of Law in Paris, in his 1920s codification 
of the Doctrine of Illegitimate Debt has been well recognized.”); Esther Pan, Iraq: The Regime’s 
Debt (Council on Foreign Relations, Dec. 31, 2003), http://www.cfr.org/publication/7796/#26 
(“…Alexander Sack, an expatriate Russian law scholar in Paris.”). 
31. Sack does not state whether he wrote the manuscript in French or some other language. 
Sack thanks “Mme Nadine Stchoupack” of the École des Hautes Études for her work on the 
French translation of his manuscript. SACK, LES EFFETS, supra note 4, at xvi. 
32. Id. at title page. The title “agrégé” refers to a professor who has passed a competitive, 
high-level teaching examination. See generally Agrégation, LAROUSSE PETIT DICTIONNAIRE DE 
LA LANGUE FRANÇAISE (1987). 
33. See Alexander N. Sack, Diplomatic Claims Against the Soviets (1918-1938) 
(continuation), 16 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 253, 271 n.217 (1938) [hereinafter Sack, Diplomatic Claims 
(continuation)]. 
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sonably rosy picture of the stability of the Russian regime.34 It did not 
help matters that France was facing financial crisis in the late 1920s.35  
When Sack published Les Effets in 1927, he was one of many Rus-
sian refugees fleeing the Soviet regime who alighted in Paris. France 
was a favored destination for Russian refugees at the time, particularly 
for ex-tsarists. But jobs were scarce and by the late 1920s, anti-refugee 
sentiments had bubbled to the surface.36 As a professor at the university, 
Sack was likely doing better than many of his fellow refugees. 
This particular historical context raises the question whether Sack’s 
doctrine of odious debts was consistent with his other writings on the 
subject, or whether his somewhat precarious position as an émigré in 
France may have influenced the way Sack presented his doctrine of odi-
ous debts. On the one hand, Sack might have been inspired to make a 
strong statement against the Soviet repudiation, thereby pleasing what 
he may have perceived as the popular audience for his book (the masses 
of French bondholders). On the other hand, as there was a debate among 
French intellectuals about the propriety of the Soviet repudiation, Sack 
may have wanted to finesse his opinion on the subject, hoping not to 
alienate either faction.  
C. The Pre-Eminent Scholar on Public Debts and State 
Succession; a Scholar of International Law; the Originator of 
the Doctrine of Odious Debts 
Modern scholars and activists appear to assume that Sack was a 
scholar of international law, and, to varying degrees, that he was pre-
eminent. Sack is often described as the “preeminent” or “an eminent” 
scholar of public debts and state succession of his time,37 which is cru-
cial for establishing his credibility as a publicist and the legitimacy of 
                                                          
34. See James William Long, Russian Manipulation of the French Press, 1904-1906, 31 
SLAVIC REV. 343 (1972). 
35. E.g., STEPHEN A. SCHUKER, THE END OF FRENCH PREDOMINANCE IN EUROPE: THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 1924 AND THE ADOPTION OF THE DAWES PLAN (1976).    
36. See, e.g., James E. Hassell, Russian Refugees in France and the United States Between 
the World Wars, in 81 TRANSACTIONS OF THE AMER. PHIL. SOC. 1, ch. 3 (1991); Tatiana 
Schaufuss, The White Russian Refugees, 203 ANNALS OF THE AMER. SOC. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 
45, 50 (1939). 
37. See, e.g., Emily F. Mancina, Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God: Resurrecting the 
Odious Debt Doctrine in International Law, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1239, 1246 (2004) 
(Sack was “the world’s pre-eminent legal scholar on public debts”); Nsongurua J. Udombana, The 
Summer Has Ended and We Are Not Saved! Towards a Transformative Agenda for Africa’s 
Development, 7 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 5, 25 (2005) (noting Sack’s scholarly eminence); Bradley 
N. Lewis, Restructuring the Odious Debt Exception, 25 B.U. INT’L L.J. (forthcoming 2007).  
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relying on his 1927 work as a source of customary international law. 
The origin of Sack’s reputation as the preeminent scholar in the field 
may be Ernst Feilchenfeld’s 1931 treatise, Public Debts and State Suc-
cession, in which he called Les Effets a “remarkable” and “profound” 
work.38  Sack is also characterized as the originator of the odious debts 
doctrine, that is, as the one who first formally articulated it as a doc-
trine.39 His work on the topic is described as “seminal,” “the first,” and 
“original.”40 
III. THE LESS CONVENIENT STORY 
Few of the Sackian myths withstand scrutiny. Sack, a Russian Jew, 
was just twenty-seven years old when the virulently anti-Semitic Tsar 
Nicholas II was deposed, yet contemporary commentators have raised 
him to the rank of a precocious tsarist minister. Sack spent the majority 
of his professional career in the United States, and yet his modern ad-
mirers know him as a Russian jurist living in Paris. Sack is thought to-
day to have authored a revolutionary doctrine. Instead, Sack’s work was 
censored by the Bolsheviks and he was a fierce and consistent defender 
of the rights of creditors and the notion that successor governments can-
not lightly shrug off the burden of state debts. 
Yet it was not Sack who misrepresented his biography. His biogra-
phies in Who’s Who and the Dictionary of American Jewry, his obituary 
in the New York Times, the applications he submitted to the Guggen-
                                                          
38. FEILCHENFELD, supra note 13, at 574, 575. But Feilchenfeld also disagreed with Sack as 
to his “approach, method, and conclusions,” id. at vii, and devoted eight pages to a repudiation of 
Sack’s central thesis. See id. at 591–98 (delivering a blistering attack on the concept of 
international financial law in general and on Sack in particular). 
39. See, e.g., SABINE MICHALOWSKI, UNCONSTITUTIONAL REGIMES AND THE VALIDITY OF 
SOVEREIGN DEBT: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 55, 60 (2007) (recognizing Sack as “the father of the 
odious debts doctrine” and as “the ‘inventor’ of the odious debts doctrine”); Jubilee Iraq: Odious 
Debt, http://www.jubileeiraq.org/odiousdebt.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2007); Odious Debts, 
Wikipedia, supra note 7.  
40. E.g., Patricio Pazmiño Freire, Illegitimate Debts, Debt Relief and Citizen Audits, in 
UPHEAVAL IN THE BACK YARD: ILLEGITIMATE DEBTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE CASE OF 
ECUADOR-NORWAY 11, 15 (Leslie Wirpsa trans., 2002),  available at 
http://www.globalfairtrade.ca/CDES%20Ecuador%20Norway%20Debt.pdf (“The seminal 
definition was established by…Sack in 1927[.]”); Adam Feibelman, Contract, Priority, and 
Odious Debt, 85 N.C. L. REV. 727, 738 (2007) (Sack was the “first” to identify a doctrine of 
odious debts); Sanjay G. Reddy, International Debt: The Constructive Implications of Some 
Moral Mathematics, 21 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 33, 44 (2007) (Sack “initiated” the discussion of 
odious debt in the 1920s). 
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heim Foundation, the New York Bar, and the DOJ, and numerous re-
sumes are remarkably consistent and almost completely verifiable.41 
Here are the broad outlines of Sack’s life, as pieced together from his 
resumes, letters, and personal papers. Aleksandr Naumovich Zak was 
born in Moscow in 1890. His father was a doctor and professor of medi-
cine at Moscow University.42 He graduated from gymnasium (high 
school) in 1908 and studied economics at St. Petersburg University for 
one year before returning to Moscow to earn a degree from the law fac-
ulty and become a member of the bar in 1911.43 For the next three years, 
he engaged in further study in a variety of locations and published sev-
eral scholarly articles.44 From 1914 to 1916 he fought for the Russian 
army on the front in World War I. In September 1917, he was back in 
                                                          
41. Sack claims only a few liberties, for example, by eliding the critical parts of book reviews 
when he provides prospective employers with typed excerpts of the reviews of Les Effets. We 
found two other deviations from strict truth. First, Sack allows himself to be called an “ancien 
professeur agrégé” on the title page of Les Effets. SACK, LES EFFETS, supra note 4, at title page. 
The rank of professeur agrégé is quite rare, as the professor must pass a series of advanced 
exams. There is no evidence that Sack achieved that title in France, or a similar rank in Russia. 
Second, on his New York bar application, Sack omits that he served on two government 
committees after the revolution. Questionnaire and Statement of Applicant, Alexander Nahum 
Sack, Filed in the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York (Sept. 22, 
1937), at questions 12, 13 (on file with authors). 
42. In an autobiography Sack wrote for Erwin Griswold in preparation for his case before the 
AALS, Sack notes that his father, Naoum Basil Sack, was “Doctor of Medicine, Professor of 
Medicine at Moscow University, Councillor of State in (old) Russian Government Service.” 
Alexander Sack, Autobiographical Note (on file with authors). See also Faculty Biography for use 
of New York University Bureau of Public Information, Summer 1942 (on file with authors) 
(noting that father was a professor of medicine at Moscow University and a “Councillor of State 
(before the Revol.)”). 
43. Questionnaire and Statement of Applicant, supra note 41, at questions 5, 7. 
44. It is not entirely clear what Sack did from 1911 to 1914. His New York Bar application 
suggests that he may have practiced law. Id. at questions 12, 13. In 1929, however, he testified as 
an expert witness that he had never practiced law in Moscow. Transcript of Record, vol. 5, at 69, 
Perry v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 172 S.E. 527 (N.C. 1934) (on file with authors). His 
Guggenheim application indicates he was involved in special studies from 1912 to 1913, but it is 
not clear where. Fellowship Application Form of Alexander N. Sack, John Simon Guggenheim 
Memorial Foundation, at question 1 (application acknowledged Oct. 15, 1935) (on file with 
authors). The autobiography Sack wrote for Erwin Griswold indicates that he was studying in 
either Berlin, Munich, Paris, or London. Sack, Autobiographical Note, supra note 42. According 
to Sack’s curriculum vitae, he published five works in Russian during this time: The Peasant 
Land Bank, 1883–1910, economic, financial and statistical researches (1911); Methods of the 
Science of Finance and Financial Law (1913); Participation of Legislative Bodies in the Control 
and Supervision of State Banks in Russia and Abroad (1913); Germans and German Capital in 
Russian Industry (1914); Central Banks—Unions of Banks (1914). Alexander N. Sack, 
Curriculum Vitae (Northwestern Univ. Archives, Leon Green (1888–1972) Papers, 1929–1947, 
ser. 17/29, box 9, folder 2); see also SACK, LES EFFETS, supra note 4, at Principaux ouvrages du 
même auteur. 
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Petrograd, taking an oral examination to earn the degree of Magister, 
which entitled him to lecture as an assistant professor in the law fac-
ulty—something he could not have done in the tsarist regime because he 
was Jewish. Sack notes on his New York bar application that he was al-
lowed to take the exam based on his previously published writings; he 
was not required to submit a thesis.45 
Sack left Russia permanently in 1921. He moved to Estonia—at that 
time, an independent country—where he advised the government on fi-
nancial matters such as currency reform. He became a citizen of Estonia 
in 1922 and married his wife, Nina, in 1924. In 1925, the Sacks moved 
to Paris, where Sack taught at the Institute des Sciences Sociales et 
Politiques and the Ecole des Hautes Etudes Internationales while writ-
ing Les Effets. In 1928, he lectured at the school of International Law at 
The Hague, and in 1929, he appeared as an expert witness in London on 
behalf of Equitable Life Insurance. Sack’s work for Equitable Life 
brought him into contact with John W. Davis, who employed Sack in 
one of the Equitable Life cases his firm was litigating in New York. 
In 1930, Northwestern University invited Sack to visit as a professor 
of international law for one year; the Sacks left Europe permanently and 
became citizens of the United States. Sack lectured at Northwestern for 
two years, and then moved to NYU, where he taught for the next eleven 
years. NYU terminated Sack in 1943, claiming that the financial exi-
gencies of the war required them to drop the salary of one full-time pro-
fessor. Sack, who believed he had been fired for writing a controversial 
letter to the New York Times, filed a complaint with the Association of 
American Law Schools (AALS), in which he was represented by Erwin 
Griswold—then a professor at Harvard Law School. After losing his po-
sition at NYU, Sack worked for the DOJ from 1943 to 1947, and then as 
a solo practitioner. By 1953, he and his wife were in a desperate finan-
cial situation; they were admitted as residents of the Andrew Freedman 
Home in the Bronx—a retirement home for the “formerly wealthy.”46 
Sack died two years later. 
                                                          
45. Questionnaire and Statement of Applicant, supra note 41, at question 7. 
46. Sack’s obituary tells us that he died at the Andrew Freedman Home in the Bronx, New 
York. Sack Obituary, supra note 3, at 27. The Freedman house was set up as a home for “the 
formerly wealthy.” Christopher Gray, Streetscapes/The Andrew Freedman Home: A Retirement 
Home Built for the Formerly Wealthy, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1999, Real Estate at 5. According to 
Jim Crocker, who directs the Freedman Home, Andrew Freedman established the home 
particularly for married couples who had formerly been wealthy, to save them from having 
arguments in their later years over the loss of their elevated financial and social status. 
Apparently, Mr. Freedman’s parents had argued about money when he was young and he wanted 
to protect others from that trauma. Interview by authors with Jim Crocker, Director, Freedman 
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Sack’s name is invoked today to conjure up the image of an éminence 
grise—a distinguished professor of international law puttering around 
an office stuffed with files of crumbling treaties. In real life, he was can-
tankerous, outspoken, querulous, and litigious, and he ended his days 
penniless. Researching the life of Alexander Sack is a bit like discover-
ing that Che Guevara was a faithful reader of the Wall Street Journal; 
the myth is destroyed, but replaced by a man more nuanced, complex, 
human, and real. 
A. Neither a Tsarist Minister nor a Revolutionary Hero 
An examination of the details of Sack’s life reveals that none of the 
prevailing mythologies about Sack’s Russian experience are true: he 
was never a tsarist minister nor a sympathizer or fellow traveler with the 
Bolsheviks, and he firmly believed that the Bolshevik repudiation of the 
tsarist debt was legally indefensible. 
It is certain that Sack never served as a minister to Tsar Nicholas II. 
Most importantly, Sack never claims this role for himself—not in the 
resume he submitted to obtain a job at Northwestern University, in his 
application to receive a Guggenheim Fellowship, in his sworn applica-
tion to the New York Bar, in the dossier he submitted to the DOJ, in his 
application to the Andrew Freedman Home, in the biography he wrote 
for Erwin Griswold, or in his biography in Who’s Who in America.47 It 
is telling that he never claims to have held such a position—nor even to 
have worked in a tsarist ministry—in his sworn submissions to the New 
York Bar and the DOJ. He submitted those documents in 1937 and 
1943, and being Russian by birth, he probably would have been moti-
vated to establish his anti-communist credentials by claiming an asso-
ciation with the Tsar or the pre-communist government. 
The likely source of the misapprehension of Sack’s role as a tsarist 
minister is the “biographical notice” that appears in a collection of in-
ternational law lectures—including Sack’s lectures on the succession of 
public debt—sponsored by the Academy of International Law in Paris.48 
                                                                                                                                      
Home, in the Bronx, N.Y. (May 29, 2007). The application process for entry into the Freedman 
Home was rigorous; Sack had to demonstrate both his formerly elevated status and his current 
penury. Yet nowhere in his application does he suggest that he had held a position in the Tsar’s 
government. See Alexander Sack, Archival Material Obtained from the Freedman Home in May 
2007 (on file at Duke University Law Library). 
47. 22 WHO’S WHO IN AMERICA 1911 (Albert Nelson Marquis ed., 1942–1943). 
48. A.N. Sack, La Succession aux Dettes Publiques D'État, in RECUEIL DES COURS 1928 III 
TOME 23 DE  LA COLLECTION 147 (1929). The separately published version of these lectures does 
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The biographical notice (written in French) lists, among Sack’s accom-
plishments, that he served in 1917 on the Ministry of Finance’s com-
mission to reorganize Russian finances and as legal counsel to the 
Committee on Commercial Banking.49 Thus, while Sack was participat-
ing in the Russian government in 1917—although not as a minister—he 
was likely doing so under the auspices of the Provisional Government, 
not the Tsar or the Bolsheviks.50  
Records of the Tsar’s government also suggest that Sack never 
served in a ministerial role. Had he been one of the Tsar’s ministers, he 
would likely have been the minister of finance since his expertise was 
on exchange rates, currency stabilization, and public finance. But the 
Tsar’s minister of finance from 1907 to 1913 was Vladmir Kokostov, 
followed by P.I. Bark from 1913 to 1917.51 Further, Sack’s youth and 
inexperience in 1917 most likely precluded his service as a tsarist minis-
ter. Sack was twenty-seven and had been a member of the bar in Mos-
cow for only three years when the Tsar abdicated; he had also been 
fighting on the front until 1916. This leaves roughly one year in which 
he could have been a minister (from when he was demobilized in 1916 
until March 2, 1917), but the post was occupied by another man. 
                                                                                                                                      
not have a biographical notice. ALEXANDER N. SACK, LA SUCCESSION AUX DETTES PUBLIQUES 
D’ÉTAT (1929). 
49. In English, Sack writes that he was a “Member of Council, Ministry of Finance, Russia, 
1917; Counsel, All-Russian Committee of Commercial Banks, 1917–1918.” Faculty Biography, 
supra note 42, at 2; see also Sack, Autobiographical Note, supra note 42. 
50. Sack’s participation on the committees does not mean that he was a Bolshevik. To keep 
the government going, the Bolsheviks were forced to retain a bureaucracy of “‘old officials, 
inherited from the Tsar and from bourgeois society.’” 1 EDWARD HALLETT CARR, THE 
BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION 1917–1923, at 254 (Penguin Books 1966) (1950). 
51. Kokostov was renowned for successfully balancing the budget after the political 
turbulence of 1904–1906. PETER GATRELL, RUSSIA’S FIRST WORLD WAR: A SOCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC HISTORY 133–34 (2005). Kokostov’s first term, when Russia was involved in its ill-
fated war with Japan, was characterized by his attempt to finance the economy through 
borrowing, resulting in an enormous loan of 620 million rubles from France. The focus during his 
second term was more on economic recovery and reconstruction. On Kokostov’s economic 
policies, see VINCENT BARNETT, THE REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIAN ECONOMY 1890–1940: IDEAS, 
DEBATES AND ALTERNATIVES 38–40 (2004). See also L.N. Yurovsky, Problems of a Moneyless 
Economy, in MARKETS AND SOCIALISM 50 (Alec Nove & Ian D. Thatcher eds., 1994). The other 
prominent Minister of Finance around that period was Sergei Witte, who was minister from 1892 
until 1903. See BARNETT, supra at 29; GATRELL, supra at 134. More broadly, Sack (or Zak)’s 
name is not mentioned in Barnett’s list of prominent thinkers on economic matters of the time, 
suggesting that the very young Sack and his early writings had not reached a position of 
prominence before the Tsar’s abdication. See BARNETT, supra at 25. 
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Finally, there is Sack’s Jewish heritage.52 Sack’s father probably 
benefited from one of the “great reforms” of Tsar Alexander II—a pro-
gram of “selective integration” that allowed Jews to enter educational 
institutions, train for professions, and thereby gain the privilege of liv-
ing “outside the Pale.”53 By the time Sack reached school age, however, 
Tsar Nicholas II had significantly rolled back these reforms, imposing 
severe limits on the numbers of Jewish students who could be admitted 
to gymnasia and universities.54 Sack would have been among a handful 
of Jewish students admitted to these institutions at the turn of the cen-
tury, showing that he was a very promising student. Nevertheless, edu-
cated Jews were prohibited altogether from entering the civil service 
and joining university faculties.55 When Sack entered the work force in 
1911, the only professions open to Jews were medicine and law, and 
even the bar imposed a quota on Jewish membership in the waning days 
of the tsarist regime.56 It was not until March 20, 1917, when the Provi-
sional Government in St. Petersburg abolished all distinctions based on 
nationality, ethnicity, religion, or estate,57 that Sack could have pursued 
a government position or a career in academics. 
While it is difficult to imagine how anyone whose education and ca-
reer options had been so curtailed by the tsarist regime could be de-
scribed as “tsarist,” it is also clear that Sack did not gain favor with the 
Bolsheviks after they came to power. Sack remained in St. Petersburg 
from 1917 until 1921 (roughly, for the duration of the Russian civil 
war), when he decamped for Estonia.58 During this time he served on 
                                                          
52. In today’s terms, Sack might have been described as culturally, but not religiously, 
Jewish. On the one hand, he identifies himself as Jewish and is listed in the dictionary of Jewish 
biography; on the other hand, he was married to a gentile. Sack wrote Erwin Griswold that, 
“though a religious man in a personal way, I have never been affiliated with any organized 
religion.” Letter from Sack to Griswold 4 (Feb. 13, 1944) (on file with authors). He quoted from 
the Old and New Testaments in several of his letters to Griswold. See, e.g., Letter from Sack to 
Griswold 3 (Aug. 5–6, 1944) (Eph. 6:11) (on file with authors); Letter from Sack to Griswold 4 
(Mar. 4, 1944) (Psalm 35) (on file with authors); Letter from Sack to Griswold 3–4 (Jan. 9, 1944) 
(Psalm 94) (on file with authors); see also 3 WHO’S WHO IN AMERICAN JEWRY 912 (John 
Simons ed., 1938–1939) (biography of Alexander Sack); Alexander Sack, Archival Material, 
supra note 46 (application of Nina Sack indicating her religious affiliation). 
53. BENJAMIN NATHANS, BEYOND THE PALE: THE JEWISH ENCOUNTER WITH LATE 
IMPERIAL RUSSIA 45–69 (2002). 
54. Id. at 201–59. 
55. Id. at 208–09. 
56. Id. at 346–66. 
57. Id. at 12. 
58. After leaving Russia in 1921, Sack moved to Revel, Estonia, where he married Nina 
George Duguin and became an Estonian citizen. Alexander Sack, Archival Material, supra note 
46 (copies of marriage certificate and Estonian citizenship papers). Sack published several articles 
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the two aforementioned government committees, continued lecturing at 
the university, and published several articles. There is scant evidence 
about Sack’s political alliances during this time in Paris, but we do 
know that he became friendly with two prominent anti-Bolsheviks—
Peter Struve and Baron Boris E. Nolde—suggesting that he may at one 
point have been allied with the Constitutional Democrat (Kadet) Party 
or later, the White Russians.59 
Sack’s written work precipitated his disfavor with the Bolsheviks. In 
the second preface to his 1923 book Restructuring of Sovereign Debts, 
Sack writes that he had substantially completed the work in 1918 as part 
of a comprehensive study of the “bankruptcy of the state of Russia,”60 
but that the original printing matrix for the work had been destroyed by 
order of the Soviet Commissar of the Press.61 Not coincidentally, Sack 
                                                                                                                                      
on currency reform in the Baltic States and appears to have worked in the Finance Ministry, 
writing memos to the Minister on matters such as the gold standard and the issuance of paper 
money. Zak Archival Material from Bekmeteff Archives, Columbia University (on file with 
authors). He was not the minister of finance in Estonia. E-mails from Central Bank of Estonia to 
Mitu Gulati dated May 17, 2007; May 15, 2007. 
59. Before the revolution, both Baron Boris E. Nolde and Peter Struve were members of the 
Constitutional Democratic Party. Struve fled Russia after the October Revolution and joined 
forces with the White Russians, settling in Paris after 1920. See generally RICHARD PIPES, 
STRUVE: LIBERAL ON THE LEFT, 1870–1905 (1970); RICHARD PIPES, STRUVE: LIBERAL ON THE 
RIGHT, 1905–1944 (1980) [hereinafter PIPES, STRUVE: LIBERAL ON THE RIGHT]. Baron Nolde 
was a professor of international law and the legal advisor in the Tsar’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, and briefly the vice minister of Foreign Affairs after the February revolution. After 
resigning his post as vice minister, he remained active in the provisional government and, after 
the October Revolution, continued lecturing in international law. In 1919, he emigrated to Paris. 
See generally Peter Holquist, Dilemmas of a Progressive Administrator: Baron Boris Nolde, 7 
KRITIKA: EXPLORATIONS IN RUSSIAN & EURASIAN HIST. 241, 245–53 (Spring 2006). 
In 1922, Struve was appointed to help review a dissertation that Sack submitted to the Russian 
law faculty in Prague to receive a master’s degree in financial law. Sack’s dissertation was 
rejected. G. Starodubtsev, Voprosy prepodavaniia mezhdunarodnogo prava v Protokolakh 
Russkogo iuridicheskogo fakul’teta v Prage [Questions of Teaching International Law in 
Protocols of Russian Law Faculty in Prague], 24 PRAVO I ZHIZN (1999) (citing to various 
documents in the State Archive of the Russian Federation). Nolde favorably reviewed Les Effets 
in a French journal. See infra note 122.  In a 1927 letter, Sack thanks Struve for defending his 
honor as a researcher in the Prague incident. Letter from Alexander Sack to Peter Struve (Apr. 6, 
1927) (on file with Hoover Institution), translated in Letter from Arman Tasheneff to Mitu Gulati 
(Sept. 14, 2007) (on file with authors). Both Nolde and Struve wrote letters of recommendation 
for Sack to Columbia University. Letter from Alexander Sack to Peter Struve (Apr. 15, 1927) (on 
file with Hoover Institution), translated in Letter from Arman Tasheneff to Mitu Gulati (Sept. 14, 
2007) (on file with authors). 
60. A.N. SACK, RAZVERSTKA GOSUDARSTVENNYKH DOLGOV [RESTRUCTURING OF 
SOVEREIGN DEBTS] 19–22 (1923) [hereinafter SACK, RAZVERSTKA]. Cf. Anna Gelpern, Odious, 
Not Debt, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81 (2007) (also discussing Razverstka and noting that it 
casts doubt on the modern view of Sack). 
61. SACK, RAZVERSTKA, supra note 60, at 3 n.2.  
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in Restructuring expounds the prevailing theory of sovereign debt—that 
the debts of the previous government should be repaid when a new gov-
ernment comes to power—and does not articulate a theory of odious 
debt. In the preface, Sack also asserts that the Bolshevik movement is a 
transient one and addresses himself to the imminent rebirth of the Rus-
sian state, the attendant restoration of legality, and the task of restoring 
fiscal sanity to the bankrupt nation.62 Poignantly, he cites the many debt 
assumption proclamations by leaders of the factions opposed to the Bol-
sheviks, such as Koltchak and Kerensky.63 Finally, Sack asserts that a 
resolution of the sovereign debt issue will determine whether the other 
“great states” of Europe will officially recognize Bolshevik Russia or 
treat it as the “sick person” of the Eurasian continent.64  Restructuring 
reveals that Sack was far from being the former tsarist minister who re-
formed and articulated a doctrine that would rid the proletariat of the 
burden of debt imposed from the grave by the Tsar. Rather, Sack be-
lieved that the new debts incurred by the Soviets risked being illegiti-
mate because the government was lawless. No wonder the commissars 
ordered the destruction of Sack’s book. 
Sack’s contempt for the Bolsheviks resurfaced in his later writings. In 
1938, he wrote an article recounting two decades of unsuccessful efforts 
by foreign nations to get satisfaction from the Soviets for their various 
property confiscations and repudiations of public debt.65 In the conclu-
sion, he laments the “melancholy” state of these foreign claims, noting 
that the Soviet Union had become a “powerful industrial countr[y],” 
universally recognized and traded with, and “[y]et it has not recognized, 
nor paid, any claims arising from its decrees of repudiation, confisca-
tion, and nationalization.”66  Sack concludes by recounting a Russian 
fable of a cook and cat. The cook, who fancies himself a statesman, de-
cides to employ reason instead of immediate sanctions with the cat, 
which he discovers eating the meat. While the cook scolds, however, the 
cat polishes off the meat. Sack, while making a point about the failed 
diplomatic efforts of the cook, is clearly disgusted that the cat will suf-
fer no harm from its greedy and wrongful actions.67 
                                                          
62. Id. at 1–2. 
63. Id. Sack relies on much the same historical evidence in Les Effets. See, e.g., SACK, LES 
EFFETS, supra note 4, at 2–9, 16–18, 22, 25, 47, 52, 82, 168, 181. 
64. SACK, RAZVERSTKA, supra note 60, at 1 (trans. Arman Tasheneff). 
65. Sack, Diplomatic Claims, supra note 22. 
66. Sack, Diplomatic Claims (continuation), supra note 33, at 281–82. 
67. Id. at 282. 
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Four years later, Sack was so outraged by the suggestion that he 
sympathized with the Soviets that he sued the New York Times for pub-
lishing a letter that, according to Sack’s complaint, “charged him ‘with 
being a defender and supporter of communism as a system.’” (The let-
ter, at most, charged Sack with showing sympathy for Soviet interests 
during World War II.)68 When a colleague at NYU advised him strongly 
not to respond to the letter (in effect forbidding him to, as this colleague 
served as the law school censor), Sack was distraught, and indeed, this 
incident was the beginning of the decline of his employment relation-
ship with NYU. In a hearing conducted by the university, Sack stated 
“you must remember that I was driven out of Russia…because of the 
Communists, and for me then to be represented as an advocate of com-
munism…and not be allowed to answer the attack, upset me pro-
foundly.”69 Later, in a statement submitted as evidence to the AALS, 
Sack wrote that he left Russia in 1921 “because of my opposition to the 
Soviet Government,” and that he has, as a “matter of public record,” al-
ways been “opposed to Communism.”70 
Finally, if the foregoing evidence is not sufficient to prove that Sack 
was not a Bolshevik sympathizer, there is the matter of Sack’s entry into 
the U.S. legal community. Sack came to the New York legal market via 
London as a result of his work as an expert witness on Russian domestic 
law.71 While in Paris, Sack was hired by an English law firm in a Lon-
don-based case defending Equitable Life Assurance from claims from a 
Russian policy holder. Sack also appeared in New York iterations of the 
case, having been hired by firms such as Sullivan & Cromwell, Shear-
man & Sterling, and Davis Polk.72 Sack’s arrival in the United States 
                                                          
68. Sack’s lawsuit was dismissed because the letter was not libelous per se; it did not accuse 
Sack of being a communist or of having communistic beliefs. Sack v. New York Times Co., 59 
N.Y.S.2d 888, 889 (App. Div. 1946). In the 1940s, even some of the most strident anti-Bolshevik 
refugees were defending aspects of the Soviet regime. See PIPES, STRUVE: LIBERAL ON THE 
RIGHT, supra note 59, at 440 (noting that even Struve “viewed the Red Army as a national army 
and Soviet victories as victories of the Russian nation”). Thus, Sack was not alone in being both 
anti-communist and advocating support for the plight of the Russian nation. 
69. Alexander Sack, Statement at N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Committee Meeting 3 (Dec. 30, 
1942) (transcript on file with authors). 
70. Complainant’s Statement, In the Matter of Professor Alexander N. Sack, Complainant, 
Before the Am. Assoc. of Univ. Professors and the Assoc. of Am. Law Schools ¶¶ 1, 9 (Dec. 
1943) (on file with authors); see also Letter from Eustace Seligman to Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Esq. 
(Jan. 25, 1943) (“[Professor Sack] had been naturally greatly disturbed at being accused in the 
Weaver article [printed by the Times] of entertaining communist views when, in fact, he was a 
refugee from the communists….”) (on file with authors). 
71. See infra text accompanying notes 93–97. 
72. Questionnaire and Statement of Applicant, supra note 41, at question 13. 
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was not as an academic émigré from Paris spouting radical ideas. He 
came to the attention of American lawyers because of his helpful testi-
mony on behalf of a large insurance company. Not exactly the building 
blocks for a radical legend. 
Thus, far from being a revolutionary hero, Sack strongly opposed the 
Bolsheviks, and their rise to power caused him to leave Russia to make 
a career for himself elsewhere. In 1918, when Sack prepared his manu-
script that overtly condemned “lawless” Bolshevik policy, he was for-
mulating and articulating principles of law that he consistently pro-
moted throughout his career. Perhaps Sack hoped that one of the other 
factions in the civil war would ultimately wrest control of Russia from 
the Bolsheviks, and that Restructuring would put him in a good position 
for a ministerial position in a more law-abiding government. Unfortu-
nately for him, Sack backed the wrong group; having been censored for 
strongly opposing the Bolshevik position on public finance and sover-
eign debt, Sack would have realized, at the end of the civil war, that he 
had no future in communist Russia. 
B. An American Professor of Law Teaching in New York, Whose 
Scholarship Was Consistently and Uncompromisingly Pro-
creditor  
Sack’s reputation as a Russian professor of law teaching in Paris, 
while technically true, is an oversimplification. Sack taught for eight 
years on Russian and French law faculties, but he also spent thirteen 
years teaching in the United States.73 And while Sack was born and 
educated in Russia, he left Russia in 1922, never to return, and immedi-
ately became an Estonian citizen. He became an American citizen in 
1936, shortly after emigrating.74 Going by the numbers alone, it would 
be as accurate—if less romantic—to describe Sack as an American pro-
fessor of law who taught in New York rather than a Russian professor 
of law who taught in Paris. But neither description accounts for the 
complexities of Sack’s background, citizenship, and peripatetic career. 
The further questions raised by the Parisian myth are less easily an-
swered. There is no evidence that Sack wanted or attempted to extend 
his stay in Paris; in any event, he did not go out of his way to court 
popular favor in France by presenting himself as strongly in favor of the 
                                                          
73. Sack was a “privatdotsent” at Petrograd University for four years, taught in Paris for four 
years and in the Hague for one. He taught at Northwestern University for two years and New 
York University for eleven. 
74. Archival material from Bekmeteff and Freedman Home (on file with authors). 
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strict rule of state succession. Sack would not have needed to compro-
mise his theories of state succession and odious debt to do so; his early 
and late writings confirm that he adhered to a strict interpretation of 
state succession and that he viewed the Bolshevik repudiation of the 
debt as illegal. But, one of the puzzles about Sack is why, in Les Effets, 
he never clearly states his views on the Soviet repudiation. Twice in Les 
Effets Sack promises to discuss the Soviet repudiation in greater depth 
in the “Annexes” to the book.75 The “Annexes” may have referred to 
Sack’s planned second volume of Les Effets, which he never wrote.76 In 
any event, in his magnum opus, published in Paris and largely spon-
sored by a French university, Sack never overtly articulates a stance on 
the repudiation. Unlike the hostile reception that his anti-repudiation 
stance received in Russia, Sack could hardly have found a more recep-
tive audience for his position than in 1920s France. 
Reading Les Effets, it is possible to infer that Sack disapproved of the 
Soviet repudiation. For example, his (incomplete) discussion of the tsar-
ist debts is located in the section of Les Effets that discusses political 
transformations, where Sack reiterates the “unanimously established” 
doctrine that the new state (i.e., the Bolsheviks’) must assume the debts 
of the old (i.e., the Tsar’s).77 This choice of location suggests that Sack 
viewed the Russian revolution as a political transformation that did not 
justify the repudiation of debts as odious. But, by failing to fully discuss 
the Soviet repudiation and declining to pronounce his opinion on the 
                                                          
75. SACK, LES EFFETS, supra note 4, at 52 (“Sur la répudiation des dettes russes par les 
Soviets, v. Annexes.”). Sack hints at his disapproval of the Soviet repudiation in a later chapter of 
Les Effets, in which he discusses the legal effect of treaties between debtor states concerning the 
debt of the prior government. Sack posits the rule that treaties that annul the obligation among 
debtor states are “null and void” from the point of view of the creditors of those states. Sack then 
describes extensively the treaties between the Bolsheviks and various states that broke apart from 
the former Russian Empire—the Baltic states, for example—in which the Bolsheviks liberated the 
former Russian territories from any debts owed the Soviet government as a result of debts 
incurred by the Tsar. Sack notes the “casualness” (desinvolture) with which the Bolsheviks took 
this step, commenting that it was caused by the Bolsheviks’ utter lack of intent to pay any part of 
the tsarist debt. Sack concludes this discussion with another (unfulfilled) promise to discuss the 
Soviet repudiation in the “Annexes.” Id. at 245 (“[A]u sujet de la répudiation de la dette russe par 
les Soviets, v. Annexes.”). The unwritten conclusion of this chapter, however, is that the various 
treaties between the Soviets and the former territories of the Russian Empire are legally irrelevant 
as concerns the claims of the creditors against those states. 
76. Id. at xiv (noting that the planned second volume will include a special case study of the 
Russian debt). Sack’s 1938 article on foreign diplomatic claims against the Soviets contains much 
of the historical information that he may have planned to include in this second volume or the 
“Annexes.” See generally Sack, Diplomatic Claims, supra note 22; Sack, Diplomatic Claims 
(continuation), supra note 33. 
77. SACK, LES EFFETS, supra note 4, at 46, 52. 
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matter, Sack leaves open the possibility that Russia’s final transforma-
tion into a communist state after the civil war may have been something 
other than political—i.e., a state succession. 
Sack does not include any reference to the Soviet repudiation in his 
chapters on odious debts, perhaps because he considered the transforma-
tion political rather than a state succession. But he does discuss a mis-
taken instance of odious debt forgiveness in this section. In the Treaty 
of Versailles, newly independent Poland was not required to pay debts 
attributable to the German and Prussian efforts to colonize areas of Po-
land. Sack opined that the Treaty wrongly treated all such debts as odi-
ous to Poland and that some of the debts should have been partitioned 
among the various ceding territories.78 Sack also disapproved of section 
255 of the Treaty of Versailles, which exempted France from paying 
German debts attributable to the territories of Alsace and Lorraine be-
cause Germany had refused to pay France for any such debts when it 
annexed those territories in 1871. In Les Effets, Sack criticized France 
for repeating the wrong perpetrated by Germany,79 which “astonished” 
one French reviewer of the book.80 
If Sack was willing to criticize mistaken instances of odious debt for-
giveness, why was he not willing to criticize a wrongful claim of odious 
debt repudiation? 
While it is impossible to know why Sack did not write more force-
fully about the Soviet repudiation in Les Effets, his coyness on the sub-
ject is part of a recurring pattern in his life: his uncompromising ap-
proach to matters concerning him and his scholarship, and an uncanny 
ability to anger the people who might have been able to help him. 
Sack’s dispute with NYU provides a case in point. Erwin Griswold rep-
resented Sack pro bono in his hearing before the AALS. Correspon-
dence reveals that their relationship broke down badly in the summer of 
1944, over Sack’s inability to compromise. The AALS had issued a ten-
tative report that, in Griswold’s opinion, “clearly and overwhelmingly” 
favored Sack and made a “real contribution to the cause of academic 
freedom.”81 Instead of reacting with elation to the report (as Griswold 
did), Sack reacted with fury at “inaccurate and baseless statements” in 
                                                          
78. Id. at 160. 
79. Id. at 149 (“Si l’Allemagne, en 1871, a commis une injustice, ce n’est pas une raison pour 
que la France en fasse autant en 1919.”). 
80. Book Review, 23 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ 604, 605 (1928). 
81. Letter from Erwin N. Griswold to Alexander N. Sack (Aug. 5, 1944) (on file with 
authors). 
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the report.82 Over Griswold’s objections, Sack submitted a 102 page 
document of errata and requested changes to the AALS committee, 
jeopardizing his good favor with the committee and his negotiating po-
sition with NYU.83 Griswold bemoaned Sack’s almost fanatical atten-
tion to the minutiae of the report, pointing out that Sack “cannot expect 
[the committee] to decide everything [his] way.”84 In later letters, and in 
his inimitably frank style, Griswold criticized Sack for his inability to 
“take advice”85 and for his selfish and “completely rigid” approach to 
the NYU matter.86 According to Griswold, Sack was “the most serious 
obstacle to the success” of Griswold’s effort to help him, and the type of 
man who “continuously adds to his own difficulties.” 87 
Griswold was not the only member of the legal academy whose good 
will Sack squandered. Sack seems to have had little sense of tact or of 
the smallness and insularity of the academic world. For example, Sack 
wrote a letter in response to Thomas Baty’s review of Les Effets, assert-
ing that Baty “thoroughly misrepresent[ed]” his ideas. Baty wrote a de-
fense of himself, and the complete, unpleasant exchange was published 
in the Yale Law Journal.88 Sack’s review of Ernest Feilchenfeld’s Pub-
lic Debts can best be described as nitpicky and mean, and so full of par-
enthetical punctuation marks (?)(!) as to be almost unreadable in 
places.89 Finally, instead of garnering support among the law faculty at 
                                                          
82. Id. 
83. Alexander Sack, Memorandum of Requests for Corrections of and Additions to the 
Tentative Report of the Committee (submitted to the AALS Committee, 1944) (on file with 
authors). The committee’s final report was slightly less favorable to Sack, and Sack was not able 
to conclude a settlement with NYU until 1946. Agreement between Professor Alexander N. Sack 
and New York University (June 18, 1946) (on file with authors). 
84. Letter from Erwin N. Griswold to Alexander N. Sack (Aug. 5, 1944) (on file with 
authors). Thomas Baty, in his 1927 review of Les Effets, makes note of—and pokes a bit of fun 
at—Sack’s overconfidence in the absolute correctness of his positions: “‘I wish,’ said Monckton 
Milnes once, ‘that I was as cocksure about anything as Macaulay is about everything.’ Professor 
Sack seldom leaves his readers in doubt as to what they are to believe.” Thomas Baty, Book 
Review, 37 YALE L.J. 273, 273 (1927). 
85. Letter from Erwin N. Griswold to Alexander N. Sack (Feb. 27, 1945) (on file with 
authors). 
86. Letter from Erwin N. Griswold to Alexander N. Sack (Sept. 11, 1945) (on file with 
authors). 
87. Id.; Letter from Erwin N. Griswold to John Gerdes, Esq. (Apr. 11, 1946). 
88. A.N. Sack, Letter to Yale Law Journal, 37 YALE L.J. 1178 (1928); Thomas Baty, Letter to 
Yale Law Journal, 37 YALE L.J. 1179 (1928). 
89. Alexander Sack, Book Review, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 608, 620–21 (1932) (reviewing PUBLIC 
DEBTS AND STATE SUCCESSION). Sack and Feilchenfeld had many things in common. 
Feilchenfeld was a German Jewish scholar who fled Germany before World War II and took 
refuge in the United States. Sack and Feilchenfeld may have encountered each other in Berlin in 
the 1920s. From the 1921 introduction to Sack’s Razverstka, we know that Sack was in Berlin in 
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NYU during his employment dispute, Sack managed to alienate all of it, 
for example, by accusing one professor of doctoring the transcript of the 
university hearing90 and by suggesting that the school should lower the 
salaries of all full-time faculty proportionally rather than dropping his 
entirely.91 In a remarkable letter submitted to the AALS, the entire full- 
and part-time faculty at the NYU law school (excluding the faculty di-
rectly involved in the dispute) supported the school in dropping Sack, 
and indicated that they preferred not “to continue association with [him] 
in view of his groundless and reckless charges against those who have 
befriended him.”92 Regardless of his scholarship and teaching abilities, 
Sack would have been treated as a pariah in academic legal circles after 
the events of the 1940s. 
The question still remains, however, why Sack, with his uncompro-
mising character, would not have strongly asserted his disapproval of 
the Bolshevik repudiation in Les Effets. It seems unlikely that he was 
hoping not to burn his bridges in Russia, as they had already been 
burned, or that he was reluctant to alienate a group of Bolshevik apolo-
gists in France, as he seemed to possess a talent for alienating groups of 
intellectuals. We do not have enough information to speculate as to his 
motivations. But Sack’s stinginess in supporting the popular French 
condemnation of the repudiation was perhaps one more manifestation of 
his knack for estranging people who might otherwise have helped him. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
the early 1920s; Feilchenfeld published a treatise on public debts in Berlin in 1922.  The 
academic interests of Sack and Feilchenfeld also intersect at another point related to the Odious 
Debt question. They were both interested in the obligations and rights of belligerent powers and 
published monographs on the subject in the 1940s. See ERNST H. FEILCHENFELD, THE 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW OF BELLIGERANT OCCUPATION (1942); ALEXANDER N. SACK, 
BELLIGERENT RECAPTURES IN INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE (1940). Feilchenfeld had his share of 
troubles finding a permanent position in an American law school (although his troubles had a 
happier ending than Sack’s). He wrote Public Debts while a visiting scholar at Harvard and 
appears to have believed himself in line for a permanent position. He was, however, denied a 
permanent position there (in part because of his “‘exceedingly unattractive personality’”), and 
spent the remainder of his academic career at Georgetown University. The difficulty Harvard had 
in extricating themselves from Feilchenfeld made them reluctant to offer positions to any further 
refugee jurists. Kyle Graham, The Refugee Jurist and American Law Schools, 1933–1941, 50 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 777, 790 (2002) (quoting Edmund Morgan to Ralph J. Baker, Nov. 2, 1943, Ernst 
Feilchenfeld Folder, Box 3, Law School – Dean’s Subject Files, 1932-46). 
90. American Association of Law Schools, Tentative Report In the Matter of Alexander N. 
Sack vs. New York University and New York University School of Law ¶ 73 [hereinafter AALS 
Tentative Report]. 
91. Id. ¶¶ 4, 61. 
92. Id. ¶ 74. 
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C. Not the Pre-eminent Scholar on Public Debts and State 
Succession, nor an Eminent Scholar of Public International 
Law, but Perhaps the First To Use the Term “Odious Debts” in 
the Sovereign Debt Context 
To determine whether Sack was the preeminent scholar on public 
debts and state succession of his day, and an éminence grise of the in-
ternational law community, we examined his background and training, 
the contemporary reviews of his book, and the way he was discussed 
and treated by other legal scholars. We also examined the sources of his 
odious debts doctrine to determine whether Sack viewed the doctrine as 
a restatement of existing law or as a new construct. 
Sack, at the time he published Les Effets, was known (if at all) as a 
scholar of Russian banking and financial law rather than a scholar of 
sovereign debt or international law. He was not the preeminent scholar 
of sovereign debt before publishing Les Effets. Rather, the book was his 
effort to become the preeminent scholar of sovereign debt, but not a 
preeminent scholar of public international law. Les Effets was an effort 
to develop a new and controversial area of law—international financial 
law—that he envisioned as a hybrid, fitting neither within the field of 
public international law nor the field of domestic law. Sack believed this 
new species of law would better serve the needs of private creditors 
owed money by state debtors than public international law. 
Contemporary evidence shows that Sack was not generally regarded 
as a scholar of international law by his peers, or as a preeminent scholar 
in any field. At the time of publication, Les Effets was widely reviewed 
and uniformly praised for its meticulous scholarship, the unprecedented 
scope of its collection of primary sources, and its usefulness for future 
writers in the area. But its central proposal—to create an international 
law of finance—was not well received, and the doctrine of odious debts 
was either overlooked by reviewers or criticized by those who noticed 
it. 
While Sack continued to write and consult on the topic of sovereign 
debt throughout his career, he never published the second planned vol-
ume of Les Effets,93 and his later scholarship focused on topics such as 
                                                          
93. Sack published a collection of lectures based on Les Effets, LA SUCCESSION AUX DETTES 
PUBLIQUES D’ETAT, supra note 48, but he did not produce the volume he ambitiously outlined in 
the introduction to Les Effets. SACK, LES EFFETS, supra note 4, at xiv (stating that the proposed 
second volume would address state financial obligations arising from contracts of all sorts, 
pensions, paper money, etc.). 
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conflicts of law, international taxation, and aviation law.94 And during 
World War II, when NYU needed to cut costs, Sack was the first full-
time professor to be dropped—an unlikely fate for an eminent (or pre-
eminent) scholar.95 
1. Sack’s Background and Training 
Sack’s educational, research, and employment background indicate 
that, in 1927, he was not an international law scholar—that is, someone 
who focused his study on the laws governing the interactions of states 
with each other. He was interested in the domestic (Russian) laws gov-
erning finance, and specifically, public finance, which includes the 
study of how states raise capital (e.g., taxation versus debt financing). 
Sack trained not only in law but also in economics, and his interest in 
public debts was probably an outgrowth of that training. His early files 
contain detailed charts of Russian public debts going back decades prior 
to the Tsar’s abdication and a study of the public finances of the British 
Raj.96 He also studied and wrote about the provisions of bond indentures 
for Russian railroad bonds, many of which were backed by guarantees 
from the tsarist government.97 But we found no files indicating an early 
interest in public international law (i.e., clippings about diplomatic ac-
tions prior to 1917). 
Sack’s early employment similarly shows his interest in public fi-
nance. He worked on two economic committees for the provisional gov-
ernment that followed the Tsar and in 1918 may have attended meetings 
between the Soviet and newly independent Estonian governments when 
they met to negotiate the fate of the tsarist debt attributable to Estonian 
territory.  Sack compiled numerous files of paper clippings about the 
negotiations over the apportionment (and the Soviet’s ultimate forgive-
ness) of the debt—the first evidence we found of his interest in an inter-
national negotiation about sovereign debt.98 After leaving Russia, Sack 
                                                          
94. See, e.g., Alexander N. Sack, Conflicts of Laws in the History of the English Law, in 3 
LAW: A CENTURY OF PROGRESS, 1835-1935, at 342 (1937); Alexander N. Sack, International 
Unification of Private Law Rules on Air Transportation and the Warsaw Convention, 4 AIR L. 
REV. 345 (1933); Alexander N. Sack, (Non-) Enforcement of Foreign Revenue Laws in 
International Law and Practice, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 559 (1933). 
95. See infra text accompanying notes 153–54. 
96. Archival Material on Alexandr N. Zak, Columbia Univ., Folders 4, 5. 
97. ALEXANDER N. SACK, RUSSIAN AND FOREIGN LAW GOVERNING THE INDENTURES 
ISSUED BY THE RUSSIAN RAILWAY SOCIETY (1917) (in Russian). 
98. Archival Material on Alexandr N. Zak, Columbia Univ., Folders 4, 5. 
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worked for the Estonian government, where he advised and wrote about 
the impact of currency fluctuations on public finance.99 
Sack’s expertise in Russian financial law helped secure his entry into 
the U.S. legal community. In 1929, Sack appeared as an expert witness 
for Equitable Life Assurance, which was then defending against claims 
on its pre-revolutionary insurance contracts. After taking control in 
1917, the Bolsheviks shut down a number of foreign companies, includ-
ing Equitable Life, seizing what assets they could.100 Equitable and 
other companies like New York Life stopped paying on claims from 
Russian contracts.101 Claimants sued the parent company both in Lon-
don and New York.102 Sack provided expert testimony on whether the 
insurance company was obligated to compensate the insureds (or more 
likely, their descendants) who presumably had fled the Soviet regime. 
He opined that the insureds had no claim; that when Equitable was 
forced to leave the Soviet Union, Equitable’s obligations were extin-
guished and the Soviet government inherited its obligations.103 Sack ap-
peared on behalf of Equitable in London, and subsequently in New 
York, and it was through this work that he gained the admiration of 
lawyers such as John W. Davis, who later sponsored his admission to 
the New York Bar.104 
Thus, when he published Les Effets in 1927, Sack was a relative new-
comer to the field of sovereign debt scholarship, having written more on 
topics related to banking, finance, and currency. According to the bibli-
ography in Les Effets, Sack had published four works relating to public 
                                                          
99. ALEXANDER N. SACK, CURRENCY REFORM IN THE BALTIC STATES (1924) (in German); 
ALEXANDER N. SACK, FIXING THE VALUE OF MONEY (1925). 
100. See To Force Regulation?, TIME, Jan. 4, 1926, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,728784,00.html; see also Rubles for 
Rudkowsky, TIME, Dec. 5, 1932, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,882474,00.html. 
101. See Rubles for Rudkowsky, supra note 100; To Force Regulation?, supra note 100.  
102. See International Law, Conflict of Laws, Operation of Recognition of Soviet Union on 
Effect of Russian Decrees in American Courts, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 292 (1935).  
103. Alexander Sack, Memorandum on Non-Liability Defense, Bekmeteff Archives, 
Columbia Univ. (on file with authors). 
104. Letter from John W. Davis to Clerk of the Appellate Division (Sept. 23, 1937) (on file 
with authors). Davis, the Davis in Davis Polk & Wardwell, a former U.S. Ambassador to the 
Court of St. James, Solicitor General of the United States, and the Democratic nominee for 
President in 1924, was a legendary conservative lawyer who argued in favor of “separate but 
equal” in Brown v. Board of Education. See WILLIAM H. HARBAUGH, LAWYER’S LAWYER: THE 
LIFE OF JOHN W. DAVIS (1973); Jerold S. Auerbach, Book Review, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1100 
(1974). 
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debt, as opposed to nine on banking, finance, and currency.105 In the In-
troduction to Les Effets, Sack explains that the recent events in Russian 
history had sparked his initial interest in public debt: the Russian revo-
lution of 1917 caused him to examine the effects of a political transfor-
mation of a state on its national debt, and the declaration of the inde-
pendence of Poland caused him to examine the effects of a territorial 
transformation. His interest grew in the succeeding years, with the Bol-
shevik “coup d'État,” the 1918 repudiation of the tsarist debts, and vari-
ous post-war treaties—particularly the Treaties of Brest-Litovsk and 
Berlin in 1918, and with the Baltic states in 1920–21. But the Introduc-
tion also confirms that Sack did not approach the topic from the point of 
view of public international law.106 
2. A Preeminent Scholar of International Financial Law, Not 
Public International Law 
In the Introduction to Les Effets, Sack explains that he perceived a 
gap in the field of international law on the subject of state succession 
and debts, and that his project for the book was to fill this gap. But 
rather than approaching the project as an international lawyer, Sack 
proposes to locate his rules on state succession within a new field called 
“international financial law.”107 Sack believed that international law 
governed only the relations among states; relationships between states 
and private creditors—specifically, private creditors who were citizens 
                                                          
105. Sack’s works on public debt included an article on the law of Russian railway bonds, a 
book on state bankruptcy, Razverstka, which addressed the partition of debts after the dissolution 
of a debtor state, and an article on the distribution of the debts of the Austro-Hungarian empire. 
SACK, LES EFFETS, supra note 4, at bibliography page:  
Le Droit des Obligations Émises par les Sociétés des Chemins de Fer en Russie et a l' 
Étranger, Pétrograd, 1917, p. 47 (en russe)…La Banqueroute d'État, Pétrograd, 1918, p. 
128 (en russe). La Repartition des Dettes Publiques en Cas de Démembrement de l’État 
Débiteur, Berlin, 1923 (Travaux des savants russes à l'étranger, t. III), p. 158 (en 
russe)…Die Verteilung der Schulden der Oesterreichisch-Ungarishen Monarchie, Kiel, 
1926, p.22. 
106. See SACK, LES EFFETS, supra note 4, at introduction. 
107. See, e.g., FEILCHENFELD, supra note 13, at 591–99 (criticizing the concept of 
international financial law); Clyde Eagleton, Book Review, 46 POL. SCI. Q. 615, 616 (1931) 
(reviewing FEILCHENFELD, PUBLIC DEBTS AND STATE SUCCESION) (describing Sack’s theory as 
“international financial law” and noting Feilchenfeld’s “wide disagreement with the other 
important current work on the subject, by Sack”); N. Politis, Preface to SACK, LES EFFETS, supra 
note 4, at I, V (noting that Sack has made a remarkable contribution to the study of a new branch 
of law that people have rightly called international financial law) (“L'ouvrage de M. SACK 
marquera, dans l'évolution du droit international, une date pour avoir fait cette demonstration au 
sujet d'un des aspects du crédit public et apporté une remarquable contribution à l'étude de la 
nouvelle branche du droit des gens qui a été justement appelée le droit financier international.”). 
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of other states—were out of its ambit. Domestic financial law, which is 
specific to each country, was also inadequate to address issues arising 
between public debtors and private creditors. Given the absence of law 
to govern this important set of relationships, Sack’s innovation was to 
propose a new species of private law—essentially, private contract 
law108—that would view states as private actors when they borrowed 
from foreign citizens on the international debt market. Sack described 
his proposed area of law as “sui generis” and envisaged it as having 
universal reach (“super-étatique”).109 
Sack was prescient because this is indeed the way in which the law 
governing state debts to foreign bondholders has evolved.110 Starting in 
the 1970s, and following the passage of sovereign immunities statutes in 
a variety of jurisdictions, the borrowing of sovereigns from private 
creditors has become a species of domestic law—namely, the domestic 
law chosen by the parties to the contracts. Perhaps not anticipating that 
states would ever be willing to waive their immunity to suit in another 
sovereign’s domestic courts, Sack proposed that a separate body of pri-
vate law be created to deal with states’ relationships with private credi-
tors. 
Thus it was clear to Sack that he was not “doing” international law in 
Les Effets, and it also was clear to the contemporary reviewers of his 
book, of which there were many. Les Effets was reviewed in legal and 
financial reviews, in several different languages, and by some of the 
most prominent scholars in international law.111 The reviews almost uni-
formly praise Sack’s effort to document the topic of sovereign debt and 
state succession. George Grafton Wilson, reviewing in the American 
Journal of International Law, writes that “students of international fi-
                                                          
108. See SACK, LES EFFETS, supra note 4, at 30–41. 
109. Id. at xi, 84–88 (“Je crois pouvoir affirmer que la succession des dettes d'État est une 
institution de droit sui generis qui ne ressortit pas au droit international public, mais au droit 
public général. Sur ce point, mes conclusions concordent avec celles de A. RIVIER, E. NYS, F. 
LISZT, en partie avec celles de F. HOLTZENDORF.”). 
110. D.P. O’Connell, State Succession and the Theory of the State, in GROTIAN SOCIETY 
PAPERS 23, 66–67 (C.H. Alexandrowicz ed., 1972) (acknowledging that Sack’s “highly original” 
work was the “imaginative precursor of the contemporary school of international lawyers which 
is attempting to subject international financial transactions to the governance of general principles 
of law mediating between public…and private international law”). 
111. We have access to what we think were likely all of the reviews of Sack’s book at the 
time because Sack himself kept a detailed list of the reviews, with complimentary excerpts from 
each of the reviews. He sent such a list to Dean Leon Green when seeking employment at 
Northwestern University in 1929, to the Guggenheim Foundation when applying for a grant in 
1936, to Erwin Griswold when preparing for the hearing before the AALS, and to the Andrew 
Freedman Home in 1953. 
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nance and of international law [are] under great obligations to the au-
thor, who has assembled such a wealth of material in such an admirable 
form.”112 In his 1931 treatise, Ernst Feilchenfeld also praises the work 
as “perhaps the most profound treatise ever written on the subject” and 
“unrivaled in its careful analysis of the details.”113 But not one of the re-
views describe Sack as the preeminent scholar in the area; rather, they 
view the work as establishing Sack as a scholar of note in this area.114 
Some prominent reviewers in the positivist tradition of international 
law reject Sack’s legal assertions outright. Phillip Jessup comments 
dryly that “in spite of the wealth of material which Mr. Sack presents, it 
is almost impossible to discover a rule of international law.”115 Hersch 
Lauterpacht mocks the notion of a set of rights that belonged neither to 
public international law nor to domestic law: “Where then does it be-
long? [Sack’s] answer is: It is a right sui generis based on ‘droit finan-
ciel’ and ‘droit public général,’ whatever that may be.”116 Lauterpacht 
comments that Sack mistakenly views international law through too nar-
row a lens; international law, while primarily concerned with the rela-
tions among states, also deals with a variety of state-individual relations 
(one state’s relations with the diplomats of another state being an exam-
                                                          
112. George Grafton Wilson, Book Review, 22 AM. J. INT’L L. 479 (1928) (reviewing LES 
EFFETS); see also Baty, supra note 84, at 275 (writing that the book “is most carefully, 
scientifically and elaborately planned, and the amount of research and thought expended on it 
must have been enormous”); Ch. R., Book Review, 34 REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 841, 842 (1927) (reviewing LES EFFETS) (“Par son érudition, par la 
richesse de sa documentation, par la profondeur et l’ingéniosité de ses aperçus, il marque une 
date dans l’étude du Droit des gens.”). Along similar lines, Nicholas Politis, in the Preface to Les 
Effets, calls Sack a “Benedictine layman,” patiently finding and parsing the evidence of 150 years 
of state practice. N. Politis, Preface to SACK, LES EFFETS, supra note 4, at II (“Avec la patience 
d'un bénédictin laïque et le discernement d'un savant averti, il a suivi de très près la longue liste 
des traités d'annexion et de règlement de dettes conclus depuis 150 ans et analysé une à une leurs 
clauses; il a recherché la manière dont elles ont été appliquées, les mesures législatives, 
administratives et judiciaires auxquelles elles ont donné lieu; il a recueilli et classé l'opinion de 
tous les auteurs qui ont écrit sur la matière.”). 
113. FEILCHENFELD, supra note 13, at 575. 
114. See, e.g., N. Politis, Preface to SACK, LES EFFETS, supra note 4, at V (“L'ouvrage de M. 
SACK marquera, dans l'évolution du droit international,…et apporté une remarquable 
contribution à l'étude de la nouvelle branche du droit des gens qui a été justement appelée le 
droit financier international.”) (“Mr. Sack’s work marks a date in the evolution of international 
law…and makes a remarkable contribution to the study of the new area of law appropriately 
called international financial law.”). 
115. Philip C. Jessup, Book Review, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 521, 522 (1928) (reviewing LES 
EFFETS). 
116. H. Lauterpacht, State Succession, 10 J. COMP. LEGIS. & INT’L L. 164, 166 (1928) 
(reviewing LES EFFETS). 
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ple).117 Thomas Baty criticizes Sack for “importing wholesale into the 
simple and austere law of nations the ideas and conceptions of private 
law.”118 For these three members of the international law community, 
Sack’s book was a useful resource for examples of treaties and national 
practice, but it would not be ranked among the works of a great publi-
cist.119 
Sack’s work was more positively received by reviewers in financial 
or economic journals, who were (by discipline or nationality) less unset-
tled by Sack’s hybridization of international and domestic law. Barbara 
Wootton, an economist at the University of London, praises Sack’s ef-
fort to create a comprehensive “code” establishing the distribution of 
debt among various components of a former state and the limits of 
creditors’ and debtors’ rights in a large variety of possible situations.120 
But Wootton criticizes Sack for abandoning the systems of sanctions 
provided by the law of nations without supplying a new system to en-
force his code.121 French legal reviewers were also receptive to Sack’s 
“constructive” efforts to propose a new code of law, one stating that this 
kind of scholarship gives practical effect to the field of international 
law, which had previously existed more as a form of literature than 
law.122 
As a work of scholarship, Les Effets had only a slight impact on 
the field of public international law before the late 1990s, probably 
because Sack’s idea of international financial law was too radical for 
its time. Feilchenfeld, writing on the same topic four years later, ac-
                                                          
117. Id. at 166. 
118. Baty, supra note 84, at 274. 
119. See also Wilson, supra note 112, at 479 (“The reader of this work of Professor Sack may 
find much with which he feels inclined to disagree.”); Louis Trotobas, Book Review, 3 L’ANNÉE 
POLITIQUE FRANÇAISE ET ÉTRANGÈRE 367, 368 (1928) (reviewing LES EFFETS) (questioning 
why Sack would abandon international law rather than trying to reform it and make it more 
responsive to the interests of private creditors); Ch. R., supra note 112, at 842 (expressing 
hesitation at the enormous potential of Sack’s proposed “super-state” law). 
120. Barbara Wootton, Book Review, 38 ECON. J. 95, 95–96 (1927) (reviewing LES EFFETS). 
121. Id. at 96. 
122. Book Review, REVUE DE DROIT BANCAIRE 333 (1927) (reviewing LES EFFETS) 
(“L’ouvrage est le type des travaux à faire pour que le droit international cesse d’ètre une forme 
de littérature et devienne une codification de pratiques réelles.”); see also Book Review, REVUE 
DE SCIENCE ET DE LEGISLATION FINANCIÈRES (1927) (reviewing LES EFFETS) (probably written 
by Gaston Jèze); Book Review, 7 RECUEIL DES DECISIONS TRIBUNAUX ARBITRAUX MIXTES 
1010 (1928) (reviewing LES EFFETS); Baron Boris Nolde, Book Review, 54 JOURNAL DU DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL 838 (1927) (reviewing LES EFFETS); P. Tager, Book Review, 66 BULLETIN DE 
LA SOCIÉTÉ DE LÉGISLATION COMPARÉE 404 (1927) (reviewing LES EFFETS); SACK, LES 
EFFETS, supra note 4, at xii (describing his project as “essentiellement constructive”). 
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cuses Sack of being “misleading” as to the “existence and non-
existence” of certain legal protections: 
[Sack] does not…state existing rules,…and claims as rules of in-
ternational financial law non-existing and controversial rules 
which have not become generally recognized in international 
law. These omissions and errors are not accidental, but a conse-
quence of his attempt to base legal results on an unrecognized 
system of law.123 
D.P. O’Connell, writing in 1972, comments that Sack failed to “attract[] 
sympathetic attention” to his ideas because his scheme of creating a 
“property relationship” between a territory and its creditors was un-
workable.124 
It was only after publishing Les Effets and emigrating to the United 
States that Sack gained expertise in the area of public international law. 
In 1930, James Garner, a public international law scholar, recommended 
Sack to be a visiting professor at Northwestern University.125 Garner 
was concerned that the faculty at Northwestern would assume that Sack 
was a public international law scholar, so he wrote Dean Leon Green on 
at least two occasions to emphasize that Sack was not a public interna-
tional law scholar and unlikely to be able to teach that subject. Rather, 
Garner explains, Sack is an expert on “International Financial Law.”126 
Despite his lack of experience in the subject, Sack taught the general 
course on international law for the two years he spent at Northwestern, 
and each year that he taught at NYU. 
3. Inventing, Rather Than Synthesizing, the Doctrine of Odious 
Debt 
While Sack may have been trying to invent a new code of interna-
tional law in Les Effets, it is still possible that his doctrine of odious 
debts restates an existing state practice, and thus that modern propo-
nents of the doctrine are justified in arguing that it is a rule of customary 
international law. Sack, after all, was noted for his meticulous research, 
and even Feilchenfeld admits that “the thorough study of international 
practice which [Sack] has undertaken in his book provides an extraordi-
nary amount of valuable information for the student of international 
                                                          
123. FEILCHENFELD, supra note 13, at 596. 
124. O’Connell, supra note 110, at 67. 
125. Garner was on the faculty of the University of Illinois Law School. See Letters from 
James W. Garner to Dean Leon Green (Mar. 31, 1930 and Apr. 2, 1930) (on file with authors). 
126. Id. 
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law.”127 But an examination of Sack’s sources for the doctrine—and the 
scant reviews it received—shows that Sack was not stating a rule based 
exclusively on state practice. 
Writing in 1927 about odious debts, Sack knew of two examples of 
state practice that, in combination, could have provided a basis for the 
three requirements (consent, benefit, and creditor knowledge) of his 
odious debts doctrine: the United States’ position in its negotiations fol-
lowing the Spanish-American war in 1898, and Justice Taft’s opinion in 
the Tinoco arbitration in 1923.128 
Sack does refer to the arguments advanced by the United States in 
favor of Cuba’s repudiation of Spanish debt following the Spanish-
American War as support for his doctrine of odious debts. In that nego-
tiation, Cuba sought to repudiate debt contracted by Spain and secured 
by Cuban revenue streams. The United States argued, in part, that the 
debts were invalid for moral reasons because they were “‘imposed upon 
the people of Cuba without their consent and by force of arms,’” and 
“‘contracted by Spain for national purposes, which in some cases were 
alien and in others actually adverse to the interest of Cuba,’” such as 
“‘the purpose of supporting a Spanish army in Cuba.’”129 Thus Sack 
could have based his requirements of benefit and consent on the asser-
tions of the United States. 
However, the position of the United States on Cuba was not exactly 
state practice at the time—not even for the United States130—and Sack 
knew as much.131 At most, it was an exception to the more generally ac-
cepted rule that a ceding territory becomes responsible for debts specifi-
                                                          
127. FEILCHENFELD, supra note 13, at 596. 
128. See, e.g., ROBERT E. SCOTT & PAUL B. STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN: 
CONTRACT THEORY AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006); Buchheit et al., 
supra note 13, at 1216–19; Feinerman, supra note 14; Jeff King, The Doctrine of Odious Debt in 
International Law: A Restatement n.328 (draft of Jan. 21, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1027682.  
129. SACK, LES EFFETS, supra note 4, at 159 (quoting 1 J.B. MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST 
OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS, TO WHICH THE 
UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 358–59, 367 (1906)). 
130. Historian Lou Perez and legal scholar Deborah Weissman point out that scholars of that 
period cannot assert with a straight face that U.S. practice was consistent with a doctrine of 
odious debts. In cases such as that involving Santo Domingo, the United States was front and 
center in arguing that all debts should be paid, regardless of their despotic roots (the despots in 
that case having been foisted on the people of Santo Domingo by the United States). See Louis A. 
Perez, Jr. & Deborah M. Weissman, Public Power and Private Purpose: Odious Debt and the 
Political Economy of Hegemony, 32 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COMM. REG. 699, 710–12, 717–19 (2007). 
131. Maybe, by refusing to follow existing state practice at the time, the United States was 
trying to alter the default rule of customary international law. But that seems implausible in light 
of the broader U.S. position at the time. Id. 
630 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 48:3 
 
 
cally attributed to the territory. Previously, in Restructuring, Sack had 
not treated the U.S.-Spain negotiation as meaningful precedent. After 
describing a number of cases in which debt succession did not follow 
territorial cession, Sack noted that: “theoreticians of international law 
considered the position initially taken by the Spanish as flawless from 
the perspective of international law.”132 This tells us two things. First, 
Sack was reporting that in 1898, the majority position in international 
law was set against acknowledging an odious debt defense. Second, 
Sack’s failure to criticize Spain and international law scholars on this 
point suggests that he agreed with the Spanish position. 
Oddly, in the odious debt discussion in Les Effets, Sack does not refer 
to the most immediate precedent for an odious debts defense—the Ti-
noco arbitration involving a dispute between Costa Rica and the Royal 
Bank of Canada—which Sack discusses elsewhere in Les Effets.133 
Sack’s doctrine of odious debts is largely consonant with the one im-
plicitly expressed by the arbitrator in that case, Chief Justice Taft. Taft 
ratified Costa Rica’s nullification of a loan contracted by the previous 
(Tinoco) government with the Royal Bank of Canada, on the grounds 
that the Bank had not acted in good faith in making the loan, which was 
secured by patently irregular currency for obviously irregular purposes 
(the personal support of the soon-to-flee dictator and payment of four 
years salary in advance to the dictator’s brother).134 The rule that Taft 
articulated is loosely based on common law: the loan was invalid be-
cause the debtor failed to prove that it had, in good faith, “fur-
nish[ed]…money to the government for its legitimate use.”135 Rather, 
the Bank actually knew, or should have known, that the funds were in-
tended for “personal and not for legitimate government purposes.”136 
Had Sack cited to Taft, he could have based his requirements of lack of 
benefit and creditor awareness on Taft’s approach. 
                                                          
132. SACK, RAZVERSTKA, supra note 60, at 21 (trans. Anna Gelpern). 
133. See SACK, LES EFFETS, supra note 4, at 2–3 (citing Tinoco’s coup as an example where 
the holder of power changed but the form of government did not); at 11, 15 (quoting and citing 
Taft’s opinion in the arbitration). Sack also does not cite to Great Britain’s 1900 decision not to 
honor the war debts of the South African Republic after the Anglo-Boer War, which others view 
as an example of the British theory of odious debts. See, e.g., Mohammed Bedjaoui, Special 
Rapporteur, Ninth Report on Succession of States in Respect of Matters Other than Treaties: 
Draft Articles on Succession in Respect of State Debts, with Commentaries, [1977] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. 
Comm’n 45, 70, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/301 and Add.1. 
134. Arbitration Between Great Britain and Costa Rica, 1 U.N. REP. INT’L ARB. AWARDS 
369 (1923), reprinted in 18 AM. J. INT’L L. 147, 168 (1924). 
135. Id. 
136. Id.; see also Gelpern, supra note 4, at 411. 
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Perhaps Sack’s omission of the Tinoco decisions was an oversight.137 
But Sack’s merit, according to his reviewers, was his painstaking thor-
oughness and his careful attention to detail in referencing the relevant 
materials to whatever point he was making. Another possibility is that 
Sack did not view the Tinoco decision as correct because Taft specifi-
cally declined to find that there had been a state succession and not a 
mere change of government in the case, and state succession (i.e., terri-
torial change) was a condition precedent for Sack’s doctrine of odious 
debts.138 But since Sack included the (in his view, incorrect) absolution 
of Poland for German colonial debt in his discussion of odious debts, it 
seems unlikely that he would fail to discuss Tinoco on the grounds that 
it was incorrectly decided.139 Another possibility is that Sack, in formu-
lating his doctrine, was not especially concerned in grounding it in the 
precedents of international practice, and that he was more interested in 
asserting his view of what the law should be, rather than what it actually 
was. 
Other than state practice, Sack relied on a broad array of scholars in 
Les Effets, many of whom had written about sovereign debt, although 
not in such depth as Sack. The notion that some debts—variously called 
hostile, war, or subjugation debts—might be invalid for reasons of eq-
uity or morality was not new to international law scholars.140 Sack’s 
work on odious debt appears to have synthesized the preexisting notions 
of hostile, war, and subjugation debts under the umbrella of odiousness, 
and added a more fleshed-out concept of the duty of creditors to dis-
cover the purposes to which a state puts the money it borrows. For ex-
ample, Sack borrowed the idea of debts “hostile” to a territory trans-
ferred between sovereigns from Charles Cheney Hyde, who devoted 
several paragraphs to the idea in his 1922 text.141 Sack cites to Hyde and 
uses the phrase “hostile” several times in his discussion of odious 
debts.142 
Sack relied on another scholar, Gaston Jèze, for the phrase “debts de 
regime.” Jèze, a French scholar of public finance, used the phrase to de-
                                                          
137. King suggests that Sack’s failure to include the Tinoco arbitration in this section was an 
oversight. King, supra note 128, at n.328. 
138. Gelpern, supra note 4, at 411–12. 
139. SACK, LES EFFETS, supra note 4, at 160, 163–64. 
140. E.g., MICHALOWSKI, supra note 39, at 47 n.77 (citing to the work of the Italian scholar, 
Nitti, writing in 1931). 
141. CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, I INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND 
APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 218 (1922) (discussion of hostile or harmful debts on pp. 209, 
213–14, 216–17, 218, 223). 
142. See, e.g., SACK, LES EFFETS, supra note 4, at 157, 160, 165–68. 
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scribe debts incurred by one of the warring regimes during a civil war, if 
the money was used to pay for the war effort and not public services. 
Successor states were not legally obligated to pay “debts de regime.” 
Otherwise, Jèze—who generally backed the rights of creditors—
believed that any debt incurred by a “regular” government should be 
considered a state debt, regardless of the uses to which that government 
puts the money.143 Thus Jèze believed that, in the absence of a civil war, 
a lender was not responsible for inquiring as to the uses of the money he 
lent to a government. While Sack cited to Jèze for the phrase, he gave it 
a significantly different meaning, defining “debts de regime” as debts 
incurred by a despotic regime for the purposes of propping up its regime 
or subjugating the population that fights against it.144 Sack thus blends 
the ideas of hostile debts and regime debts, and he rejects Jèze’s princi-
ple that creditors, except in times of civil war, were not obligated to in-
quire into the intended purposes of the money they lend.145 
                                                          
143. GASTON JÈZE, COURS DE SCIENCE DES FINANCES ET DE LEGISLATION FINANCIÈRE 
FRANÇAISE 302–03 (6th ed. 1922). Jèze, a scholar of French public finance, emphatically 
dismisses the efforts of “défenseurs du bolchevisme” to justify the Soviet repudiation of the 
tsarist debt. Id. at 305. According to Jèze, the tsar’s debts were state debts because, no matter how 
“execrable” the tsarist regime was, it was the “regular” government and not engaged in a civil war 
at the time it contracted the debt. Jèze considered the Soviet repudiation to be unjustifiable from 
both a legal and a political perspective. Id. at 304–05. 
While Jèze was a proponent of the rights of creditors, he was in many regards a better friend of 
the developing nations than Sack. Jèze represented Haile Selassie, the exiled Négus of Ethiopia, 
in negotiations with the League of Nations regarding Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia. See Jig 
Up?, TIME, July 6, 1936 (referring to Jèze as Selassie’s “wily French lawyer”). Conservative 
Royalist elements in France were outraged that Jèze would represent an African against Italy, the 
“Latin sister” of France, and demonstrated in Paris, provoking nationwide student strikes and riots 
between liberal and conservative students. Jèze was forced to hold his lectures outside of the 
university, and even then, conservative students attempted to block entrance to his classes, while 
his supporters would attempt to keep them open. See, e.g., Edward A. Jones, Royalism in French 
Politics, 8 PHYLON (1940–1956) 53, 58–59 (1947). Jèze also, despite his supposed conservative 
leanings, took the radical step of advocating increased taxation of the elites in the 1920s, when 
France was facing financial crisis. See WILLIAM L. SHIRER, THE COLLAPSE OF THE THIRD 
REPUBLIC 156 (1969). To the extent the modern odious debt movement needed to find a French 
intellectual as their hero, maybe Jèze would have been a better candidate than Sack. And for the 
Americans, there is the added attraction that Jèze was significantly influenced by both the 
Federalist Papers and the U.S. Supreme Court’s pronouncements regarding taxation and 
representation. See King, supra note 128, at 16; Apropos of Translations, 8 AM. J. COMP. L. 204, 
204 (1959) (noting that Jèze published his translation of the Federalist papers in 1902, the second 
such translation into French, the first having been in 1792). 
144. SACK, LES EFFETS, supra note 4, at 157–58. 
145. In the introduction to Les Effets, Sack acknowledges a special debt of gratitude to Jèze, 
whom Sack considered the preeminent scholar in the area. Still, Sack notes that he diverges from 
Jèze, particularly in trying to construct a legal system (“système juridique”) to govern the 
relations between states and creditors. SACK, LES EFFETS, supra note 4, at xi (“Je considère que 
notre problème ne saurait être régulièrement résolu si on ne l'analyse pas dans le plan des 
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Finally, while Sack’s use of the word “odious” to describe invalid 
state debts appears to have been new, the descriptor “odious” previously 
had been applied to immoral personal debts in an international law trea-
tise.146 In Book III of De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Grotius uses the word 
“odious” several times to describe the action of punishing or binding 
one person for the misdeeds or personal debts of another.147 When 
searching for an adjective to describe the immorality of holding a suc-
cessor state responsible for the personal (because hostile) debts of the 
previous regime, Sack—or perhaps his translator, Mme. Schtoupak—
may have relied on Grotius for using the word “odious” in that con-
text.148 
But despite adding the term “odious” and flagging the notion of 
creditor awareness, Sack did not expand the doctrine of odious debts 
                                                                                                                                      
rapports juridiques entre les créanciers et l'État débiteur. Aussi ai-je commencé par un examen 
de la nature juridique des dettes d'État. Ma manière de voir et les conclusions auxquelles 
j'aboutis se rapprochent sur bien des points, s'écartent sur certains autres, de celles énoncées 
dans les ouvrages de M. JÈZE. C'est en partant de ces conclusions que j'en arrive à construire le 
système juridique du problème qui fait l'objet des présentes recherches; c'est ici surtout que mes 
vues divergent d'une façon plus marquée de celles de l' éminent savant français.”). 
146. Even here, it is by no means certain that Sack’s use of the term “odious” in the context 
of invalid state debts was new. We have found the term “odious debt” used in the early nineteenth 
century. For example, the populist Massachusetts lawyer, Robert Rantoul, used the term in 
speeches in the United States to describe the debts of the French monarchy. Rantoul was not 
using the term in a legal sense, but the question of whether Sack got the term from these prior 
discussions is raised. See The Value of the Federal Union Calculated (July 1833), in MEMOIRS, 
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS OF ROBERT RANTOUL, JR. 203 (Luther Hamilton ed., 1854), available 
at http://books.google.com/books?id=-IssAAAAIAAJ&pg=PA203&dq=odious+debt+date:1820-
1865&as_brr=0 (using the phrase “odious debt” in an 1833 speech); see also William B. Dana, 
Our Financial Policy, 53 MERCHANTS’ MAG. & COMM. REV. 30, 32 (1865), available at 
http://books.google.com/books?id=4IkEAAAAQAAJ&pg=RA1-
PA32&dq=odious+debt+date:1820-1865&as_brr=0#PRA1-PA32,M1 (“This…exemption will do 
more to make the national debt odious….”). 
147. See, e.g., HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE Book III 1232 (Richard 
Tuck ed., Liberty Fund Inc. 2005) (1625) (“Seneca says, ‘If any Man lend Money to my Country, 
I shall not own myself his Debtor, nor take it as my own Debt, but shall willingly pay my 
Proportion to discharge the Debt.’[…] Hence it was particularly provided by the Roman Laws 
that no Peasant should be obliged for the Debts of another Peasant; and in another Place, that no 
one’s Possession should be distrained for the Debts of another, nor even for the Publick; and in 
Justinian’s Novels, Reprisals, are expressly forbid; giving this Reason for it, because it is not just 
that one Man should be the Debtor, and another be forced to pay the Debt; where also such 
Exactions are called odious. And Theodorick, in Cassiodore, called it a base License, for one Man 
to be kept as a pledge for another.”). 
The French translation of this passage of Grotius uses the word “odieuses.” HUGO GROTIUS, 
III LE DROIT DE LA GUERRE, ET DE LA PAIX 223 (Jean Barbeyrac trans., Basle 1746) 
(“[E]xécutions odieuses, comme elles sont appellées au meme endroit.”). 
148. Sack clearly was familiar with Grotius’ seminal treatise, as he cites to it numerous times 
in Les Effets. SACK, LES EFFETS, supra note 4, at 23, 31, 46, 65, 89, 90, 93. 
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beyond the ideas advanced by Taft, Jèze, Hyde, or the United States. At 
the end of his discussion of odious debts, Sack emphasizes that the de-
fense should only be recognized in exceptional circumstances, when it 
is incontestable that a debt is odious—not just in the eyes of the succes-
sor government.149 
Only a handful of the contemporary reviews of Sack’s work mention 
his doctrine of odious debts,150 suggesting that it was viewed as insig-
nificant to Sack’s general thesis, or perhaps that it was an unexciting 
synthesis of the work of prior writers that bore no mention. Baty criti-
cizes it, regarding it as a mere expedient to “save the credit” of Sack’s 
“startling” central thesis that public debt adheres to the territory of the 
state.151 Anticipating modern critics of Sack’s doctrine, Baty points out 
that the determination of whether a debt is odious depends on whether 
the government that incurred the debt was “good or bad—and that is a 
question which international law has always refused to answer.”152 Fur-
ther, Baty notes that Sack leaves a loophole for odious governments try-
ing to finance the suppression of a revolution: “[T]he ‘odious’ govern-
ment can always cover up its tracks by mixing the ‘odious’ loans with 
other more agreeable ones….So the ‘odious’ financier who backs a des-
pot has only to stipulate that the loan is partly for black-boards and test-
tubes.”153 Lauterpacht comments that Sack’s treatment of the debts of 
unsuccessful revolutionary governments—a topic related to odious 
debts—is unsatisfactory, as it fails to distinguish between debts incurred 
for the purpose of discharging normal governmental duties, which 
should be honored by the successor state, and those incurred to keep the 
revolutionary government in power, which need not be (in effect, failing 
to distinguish between debts that might be considered to benefit the 
populace and those considered odious to the populace or the successor 
state).154 
Finally, Feilchenfeld—who uses the term “odious debts” in his 1931 
book without explanation or citation to Sack—curtly notes that the 
“American and English doctrines on imposed and odious debts have 
                                                          
149. Id. at 162–63. 
150. Other than Baty and Lauterpacht, we found only two reviews that mention odious debts. 
Book Review, REVUE DE DROIT BANCAIRE 333 (1927); Book Review, REVUE DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ 604, 605 (1928). 
151. Baty, supra note 84, at 274. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Lauterpacht, supra note 116, at 165–66 (mentioning the theory of “obnoxious” debt but 
not commenting on it). 
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not…become rules of law.”155 Thus, Feilchenfeld characterizes odious 
debts as a theory—not a rule of law—and implicitly assigns its origin to 
arguments advanced by America and Great Britain—not Sack.156 Fur-
ther, Feilchenfeld argues against the idea of excusing war debts in the 
case of annexation, dismissing the arguments advanced by the British 
after the Boer war (and by extension, Sack) as “sentimental rather than 
logical.”157 
To summarize, there are several problems with the tendency of mod-
ern scholars to rely on Sack as a source of customary international law. 
First, Sack did not consider himself to be an international law scholar, 
which is shown not only by his background, training, and academic in-
terests, but also by the Introduction to Les Effets. Second, while Sack 
was, to some extent, engaged in the Anglo-American “positivist” task of 
international law scholarship, he was also engaged in the continental 
tradition of constructing and proposing new rules of international law. 
The third problem is that Sack was not considered by his peers to be an 
eminent publicist of international law. 
4. A Phantom, Not a Publicist 
Sack was not treated by his peers or his employers as a preeminent 
scholar of international law or public debts (or anything, for that mat-
ter). Had Sack been the preeminent scholar of some field, it is likely that 
                                                          
155. FEILCHENFELD, supra note 13, at 558. Feilchenfeld also uses the term “odious debts” in 
a 1928 article about German war reparations, again with no cite to Sack or anyone else. Ernst H. 
Feilchenfeld, Reparations and German External Loans, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 300, 310 (1928). 
156. Howse, while crediting Sack with originating the doctrine of Odious Debts, suggests that 
the American delegation negotiating with Spain in 1898 may have used the term “odious debts.” 
If so, then Sack and Felichenfeld may have derived the term from this source. Howse, supra note 
9, at 5, 14. 
157. FEILCHENFELD, supra note 13, at 719 (full discussion at 716–21). Feilchenfeld’s work 
on public debt, like that of Sack, turned out not to be especially influential during his lifetime. A 
search for Feilchenfeld in Westlaw’s “All Law Reviews, Texts & Bar Journals” database on July 
1, 2007, for example, yielded no citations to Public Debts prior to 1982, but three citations to his 
1942 monograph entitled THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION.  
Like Sack, Feilchenfeld has also enjoyed a surge of citations in the modern odious debt debate. A 
search for Feilchenfeld in Westlaw’s “All Law Reviews, Texts & Bar Journals” database yielded 
six citations to Public Debts after 1982. See also Seema Jayachandran & Michael Kremer, Odious 
Debt, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 82 (2006). 
In 1977, an important United Nations report on state succession and public debt, written 
originally in French, cites to Sack in discussions on the nature of state debts, whether a state 
acquiring a new territory also acquires its debts, and on localized debts. Bedjaoui, supra note 133, 
at 57, 60, 75–76, 83, nn. 26, 50–51, 127, 166. But, in its lengthy discussion of odious debts, it 
never cites to Sack; rather, it cites extensively to Feilchenfeld, including Feilchenfeld’s argument 
against the equitable reasons for excusing even war debts. Id. at 67–74. 
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the academy or the various academic institutions where he taught would 
have memorialized him in some way—as, for example, with the Philip 
C. Jessup International Law Moot Court Competition or the Lauterpacht 
Research Centre for International Law at the University of Cambridge. 
Short of chairs named in his honor, there might have been conferences 
or lecture series, portraits of him on the walls, photographs of him sur-
rounded by colleagues and students, and at least a few doctoral disserta-
tions and master’s theses written under his supervision. 
Sack’s resume indicates that he taught at five academic institutions: 
the University at Petrograd, the Academy of International Law in The 
Hague, the Institute des Sciences Sociales et Politiques and the Ecole 
des Hautes Etudes Internationales in Paris, Northwestern University in 
Chicago, and finally, New York University.158 With the exception of 
The Hague, where Sack taught for one year, the libraries of these insti-
tutions had no record of Sack—no dissertations or theses that he super-
vised, not even a photograph from an old yearbook.159 Needless to say, 
there were no buildings, chairs, lecture series, or conferences named for 
Sack. Forget preeminence; he was a phantom. 
It is especially poignant that New York University Law School, the 
institution where Sack spent eleven years—eight of them as a full pro-
fessor—had no record of his tenure there. Despite being a full professor, 
NYU dropped Sack from the faculty in 1943 as part of the law school’s 
cost-cutting measures during World War II. Sack engaged in a pro-
tracted and contentious dispute with the law school over the manner in 
which he was dropped, claiming that it was in retaliation for publishing 
an article in the New York Times urging co-operation between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. The AALS eventually found that 
the law school had wrongfully dismissed Sack, not because of what he 
wrote, but because they dropped him from a tenured position.160 The 
fact remains, however, that Sack was the first full-time professor that 
the school deemed expendable, suggesting that he had not achieved the 
eminence that would cause a university to seek alternative methods (i.e., 
seeking grants or donations) for funding his salary.161 Sadly, it seems 
                                                          
158. Sack, Autobiographical Note, supra note 42. 
159. The Ecole des Hautes Etudes Internationales had no record that Sack had ever taught 
there. The librarian explained that any records on him were likely lost in a flood due to a burst 
pipe. Telephone Interview with Denise Godard, Librarian, Institut des Hautes Etudes 
Internationales (May 2007). 
160. AALS Tentative Report, supra note 90, at 3 (basic findings V, VI, & VII). 
161. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 89, at 794–99 (describing the efforts of Columbia, 
Chicago, and Yale to keep Rheinstein and Kessler on their faculties). 
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that Sack was just not important enough to the law school—or any of 
the schools where he taught—for it to preserve his memory. 
CONCLUSION 
Sack’s life did not end happily. He was physically, emotionally, and 
financially devastated by his firing from NYU. During the employment 
dispute, Sack told the law school “I have always been a Professor, since 
1917. I have always dreamed of continuing until my old days in this 
great work of a man of science and teacher…. [F]or me, it is my whole 
life.”162 He suffered a severe hearing loss in December of 1942, from 
which he never quite recovered. (NYU cites the hearing loss as one of 
the reasons for terminating his employment.)163 Sack worked as a spe-
cial advisor to the Justice Department from 1943 to 1946 and as a con-
sultant until about 1950. After that, he was unable to find work and his 
savings ran out. In 1953, Sack and his wife, Nina, moved to the Andrew 
Freedman Home, a retirement home for the “formerly wealthy,” located 
on the Grand Concourse in the Bronx. He died two years later. 
Sack, were he able to write his own epitaph, would no doubt say that 
he was misprized, mistreated, and misunderstood in his lifetime. But he 
might also protest that he has been egregiously misconstrued and mis-
characterized in the twenty-first century. From the large corpus of his 
scholarly works, only a few sentences have been exhumed by modern 
anti-debt activists as the legal support for a proposition—that successor 
regimes may repudiate debts incurred by their distasteful predeces-
sors—that Sack in his lifetime consistently disparaged and would have 
vigorously opposed today. Why has Sack been subjected to this indig-
nity? 
There are two possible answers. The first has to do with international 
law’s prescription that distinguished publicists are among the sources of 
customary international law. In an area of law as murky as sovereign 
debt, where there are few sources of state practice through the ages, 
modern scholars have an incentive to search for a publicist from the 
past—preferably one who articulates a view of past state practice that is 
                                                          
162. Transcript of Vanderbilt Hearing at 362–63, reprinted in Memorandum of Requests for 
Corrections of and Additions to the Tentative Report of the Committee Submitted by the 
Complainant at 96–97 (written by Sack and submitted to the AALS committee in 1944) (on file 
with authors). 
163. Statement of Chancellor Harry Woodburn Chase in the case of Professor Alexander N. 
Sack at 2 (on file with authors); Letter from Frank H. Sommer, Dean, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law to 
Chancellor Harry Woodburn Chase, Chancellor, N.Y. Univ. (Mar. 9, 1943) (on file with authors). 
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consistent with what the modern scholar wants. If that publicist happens 
to have been long dead, European, and had some fancy title, he is even 
more likely to impress modern judges. Sack presents just such a fig-
ure.164 
But one of the problems with modern scholars drawing authority 
from the writings of long deceased scholars, particularly ones writing in 
a foreign language, is the ease with which mistakes can be made. 
Somewhere along the line, there was an error in translating Sack’s re-
sume—his brief work on economic matters for the Russian government 
in 1917 was translated into his having been a tsarist minister—and bet-
ter still, his doctrine of odious debts (read selectively) appeared to lean 
against the interest of his tsarist background. And then there was the 
fact that he had once taught at a university in Paris. Put all of this to-
gether and Sack makes a wonderful headliner for the modern odious 
debts movement and the argument that the doctrine of odious debts is 
part of customary international law. There is no doubt that the error and 
its perpetuation were not intended to mislead. But the enthusiastic per-
petuation of the Sackian myth only occurred (and perhaps will continue 
to occur) because no one had an incentive to unearth the true Sack; the 
myth was too convenient. 
The second answer lies in a single word: odious. Sack's 1927 book on 
state succession did not try to expand the category of state debts—war, 
hostile, or subjugation debts—that might legally be disavowed by a sub-
sequent regime. Based on his sources, Sack was merely trying to restate 
what those criteria were and constrain any tendency toward irrational 
exuberance in their application. Other scholars of his time had written 
about the topic, but none of them have attracted the attention of a curi-
                                                          
164. In international law circles, there is debate over the use of the writings of “publicists” to 
make arguments about what customary international law is. The concern of those who criticize 
the use of writings of publicists is not the misreading of history and the misuse of historical 
figures—the matter at the heart of our project—but the failure to differentiate between normative 
and positive statements about the law by modern publicists. See William J. Aceves, Scholarship 
as Evidence of International Law, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (2003); Jack 
Goldsmith, Panel Discussion: Scholars in the Construction and Critique of International Law, 94 
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 317, 319 (2000). The controversy over the use of these statements of 
publicists arises within the context of a larger debate over the expansion in recent years of 
customary international law, particularly in the context of human rights. See Curtis A. Bradley & 
Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the 
Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 875–76 (1997); Harold Hongju Koh, Is International 
Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1857 (1998); A. Mark Weisburd, American 
Judges and International Law, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1475, 1507–08 (2003); Ernest A. 
Young, Sorting Out the Debate over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 391 
(2002). 
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ous combination of twenty-first century neoconservatives and liberal 
debt relief activists. Only Sack added the winning adjective. When 
Sack’s text was discovered by modern scholars, the word “odious” 
glinted through the sediment of the passing decades, causing Sack's 
name, above all others, to be associated with this putative doctrine of 
public international law—a verbal coup that would have ensured the ca-
reer of an advertising executive on Madison Avenue. 
“Odious” satisfies the three criteria required for a successful buzzword. 
First, it is highly emotive. Second, most people understand the literal 
meaning of the word and subliminally sense its emotive baggage. 
Among legal scholars, especially, it is rare to hear a word that carries 
such clear moral condemnation; it grabs the attention of people who are 
used to dealing in deliberately ambiguous and fuzzy locutions. Third, 
most people do not use the word in everyday speech; if we heard some-
one use it in ordinary conversation instead of a word like hateful, we 
might think her somewhat pompous. This third criterion is key; a buzz-
word must not be cliché, and odious is fresh and piquant. And so, when 
succeeding generations plucked from the turgid academic prose of the 
1920s a single word—odious—they also pulled from the grave the pen, 
the hand, and the scholar who first associated that word with a small 
body of legal precedents. 
Before returning Alexander Sack to his eternal rest, let us ask our-
selves this question: how many obscure, pencil-pushing legal academi-
cians of our day would not cheerfully trade places with Professor Sack? 
To achieve fame, to have one's name turned into an adjective, to have 
one’s writings posted on the Internet a century hence, to have scholars 
of the twenty-second century research and tell one's story, this—for law 
professors—is the stuff of Mephistophelean bargains. And if that fame 
is bought cheaply by the clever (or inadvertent) use of a single word, 
and if one's fate is to be misunderstood for all eternity, what matter? 
